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I. STATUTES AND RULES OF IMPORTANCE To THE APPEAL 
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. IV: [Search and Seizure.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. XIV, CL. 1: [Citizenship Rights.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -
Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses; papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 1(a): 
General provisions, (a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the courts of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and 
proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, 
and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other 
rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and 
except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to 
i 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action. 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 8(a): 
General rules of pleadings, (a) Claims for relief. A pleading which 
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; 
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types 
may be demanded. 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 8(c): 
Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and 
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any 
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When 
a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(e): 
Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency, (e)(1) Each 
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(f): 
Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to 
do substantial justice. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(c): 
Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for 
judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the 
ii 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Hi 
II. JURISDICTION 
The district court's February 5, 2009, Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment, resolved all remaining claims in the action, thereby constituting a final 
judgment within the meaning of UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). The notice of appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court was filed on February 18, 2009, within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the final judgment, as required by UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102Q). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal 
for decision to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-
102(4). The Utah Court of Appeals therefore had appellate jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)0). The Utah Court of 
Appeals filed its final decision on Thursday, June 24, 2010 in Moss v. Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, 2010 UT App 170 , 237 P.3d 899, a genuine 
copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix 1 [hereinafter Moss], 
A Petition for Certiorari was timely filed in this Court on Monday, July 23, 
2010, within thirty days of that final decision, as required by UTAH R. APP. P. 
48(a). This Court granted such Petition for Certiorari by its Order filed on 
November 23, 2010 [hereinafter Cert. Order]. This Court therefore has 
jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
1 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Cert. Order granted certiorari on the following issue: 
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT? 
Standard of appellate review: 
The district court granted judgment on the pleadings pursuant to UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 12(C), as to Counts II through VII of the First Amended Complaint 
[hereinafter FAC], The standard for reviewing the district court's action on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is correctness. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, 
at fi 7, 191 P.3d 4, 6 ("We review the district court's denial of a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings for correctness, granting no deference to the district 
court's ruling.") 
The correctness review of a district court's decision granting judgment on 
the pleadings is in all respects the same as the review of a decision on a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Golding v. 
Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)("The grant of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the 
grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as 
a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. And in 
considering the factual allegations in the complaint, we take [the pleaded facts] 
as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
2 
a light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Emphasis added,]") 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
An armed and uniformed police officer, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff 
Heinz Kopp [hereinafter the Police] hired by private litigants who had obtained a 
court order, and accompanied by one of the lawyers who hired him, Justin P. 
Matkin [hereinafter Matkin] the lawyer's client representative, Mary Crowther 
[hereinafter Crowther] and a hired computer technician, threatened to kick down 
the door to the home [hereinafter Home] of petitioners, plaintiffs and appellants 
[sometimes collectively hereinafter Plaintiffs], Susan I. Moss [hereinafter Moss] 
and Jamal S. Yanaki [hereinafter Yanaki], if Moss did not allow the Police, Matkin, 
Crowther and computer technician to conduct a warrantless search of the Home 
and a warrantless seizure of property therein. 
This unconstitutional search of the Home and seizure of property caused 
injury to Moss and Yanaki, inter alia, in the loss of their constitutionally-protected 
right of privacy, the unconstitutional deprivation of their property, trespass upon 
their land and chattels and extreme emotional distress from the outrageous 
nature of the violation. In addition, the wrongful use of the orders that were 
obtained, for ulterior purposes not proper in the conduct of proceedings, also 
caused injury. Moss and Yanaki seek redress for those injuries by asserting 
against respondents, defendants and appellees [hereinafter sometimes 
3 
collectively Defendants] common law tort claims for abuse of process, trespass to 
land and chattels, conversion, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and civil conspiracy. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
The district court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings in a 
Ruling on Motion, dated March 20, 2007 and entered on March 28, 2007. R. 
465-468, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix 2. The district court 
held that the claims of Moss and Yanaki must be dismissed because Defendants 
(although lacking a search warrant or any exception to the warrant requirement) 
had obtained a private search warrant in civil litigation and so the warrantless 
search was "reasonable." R. 467. The district court further held that the 
Defendants could not be held liable for doing "only . . . what the order authorized 
him to do." R. 467. The district court also held that defendants were privileged to 
conduct the warrantless search and seizure by (1) their right to petition 
government, R. 467-68; and (2) the judicial proceedings privilege. R. 467-68. 
Finally, the district court held that Yanaki should have objected post facto to the 
already-executed private search warrant order and that the failure of Moss and 
Yanaki to appeal the issuance of the private search warrant (even though Moss 
was not a party to the action in which it was issued) prevented them both from 
pursuing their claims. R. 467. An order on the Ruling on Motion was entered on 
May 10, 2007, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix 3. R. 476-77. 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed by holding that "Plaintiffs cannot now 
collaterally attack the legality of the [ex parte private search warrants,]" Moss, 
2010 UT App. 170, T[ 12, 237 P.3d 899, 902, and "the [ex parte private search 
warrants] are presumed valid and we affirm the district court's ruling dismissing 
Plaintiffs' tort claims." /of., fl 14, 903. 
C. Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case 
This case is about common law torts committed in the course of a 
warrantless search and seizure. Defendants are lawyers who participated in a 
conspiracy with their client, lomed, Jnc, [hereinafter lomed], to enter the Home of 
Moss and lomed's former employee, Yanaki, without consent, ostensibly for the 
purpose of conducting discovery and preserving evidence, but in fact for the 
ulterior motive of sending a message to other lomed employees that if they did 
not sign new employment contracts, they would be subjected to the same 
mistreatment. 
1. The Police, together with Matkin, illegally entered the Home without 
a warrant and conducted a search of the Home and seizure of property, in 
violation of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States of 
America. The warrantless search and seizure constituted an actionable invasion 
of privacy, conversion, trespass to land and chattels and extreme and outrageous 
conduct First Amended Complaint [hereinafter FAC], fl 3, R. 130 (emphasis 
added). 
5 
2. Yanaki's former employer lomed conspired with the Defendants to 
cause the misuse of a legal process and the warrantless search and seizure by 
the Police, pursuant to which the Police and the co-conspirators, some of whom 
are the named in the complaint, committed the alleged torts. FAC, fi4, R. 130. 
3. On April 9, 2002, a complaint was filed in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah in a case captioned lomed, Inc. v. Jamal Yanaki, 
Activatek, LLC, Ceramatec, Inc., Ashok Joshi and John Does /-X. The 
complaint was assigned case number 020903031 and was assigned to the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Third District Court Judge. Co-conspirator Robert L. 
Lollini, who was then the Chief Operating Officer of lomed, gave the instructions 
to Defendants to cause the complaint to be filed. FAC, If 5, R. 130. 
4. The following day, on April 10, 2002, lomed and its lawyers, 
defendants Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, P.C. [hereinafter Law 
Firm], Waddoups, Hafen and Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, obtained 
upon ex parte application, a private search warrant in that civil case, purporting to 
authorize a search of the Home and seizure of property from therein. Defendants 
knew that the ex parte private search warrant was not a warrant under either the 
warrant clauses of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States 
of America. FAC, ^ 6 , R. 130-31. 
5. Although the co-conspirators purported to obtain the ex parte private 
search warrant for ostensibly lawful purposes, i.e., to protect trade secrets and 
6 
conduct discovery, they in fact sought it for illegal purposes and with ulterior 
motivations. Yanaki had left lomed's employment approximately three months 
before the ex parte private search warrant was issued. Co-conspirator lomed 
was, during the material time period, seeking to get its remaining employees to 
sign new forms of non compete agreements, lomed desired to misuse legal 
process to cause a warrantless search of the Home and seizure of YanakFs 
property as a form of message to its employees that they would be better off 
signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided. 
The ulterior motive of misusing the legal process to conduct the warrantless 
search and seizure at the Home was thus designed to put an exclamation point 
on the dangers to lomed employees of leaving lomed rather than signing the new 
form of agreements. FAC, U1J7-8, R. 131. 
6. Defendants knew the warrant statute in effect (since repealed), said: 
"Prior to issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall require the peace officer or 
the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to read to him verbatim 
the contents of the warrant." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204 (2)(a) (2003) 
(emphasis added) and they did not fit into either such class. FAC, If 10, R. 132, 
Defendants also knew that private search warrants had long ago been held not to 
satisfy the warrant requirement, as unconstitutional. Men v. Trueman, 100 Utah 
36,49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941) ("Search warrants were never recognized by 
the common law as processes which might be availed of by individuals in the 
7 
course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but 
their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for 
the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals.")(quoting 
People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 797 (1913)). FAC, fl 11, R. 132 
(and see other cases cited therein). Nevertheless, Defendants agreed to help 
their client, lomed, to conduct a warrantless search and seizure together with the 
Police. FAC, 1| 9, R. 131. 
7. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, April 15, 2002, 
Matkin and the Police rang the doorbell of the Home three separate times, 
awakening Moss. The Police agreed to join the conspiracy when they conducted 
the warrantless search and seizure and agreed to be paid by the conspirators for 
doing so. FAC, U14, R. 133. Yanaki was then in the state of Colorado. FAC, U 
15, R. 133. 
8. Moss, still in her pajamas, looked through the small window in the 
front door and saw a Police officer, whom she did not then know was Kopp, with 
another man, whom she did not then know was Matkin. Only because of the 
Police presence, Moss answered the door to her Home. Kopp handed Moss a 
summons, complaint and copy of the legal process in the form of the ex parte 
private search warrant. FAC, U 16, R. 133. 
9. After reading portions of the ex parte private search warrant and 
seeing that is was directed to Yanaki, Moss advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki 
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was not Home and she would not allow thern in her Home without Yanaki being 
present. FAC, If 17, R. 134. Matkin then said "we can come in now, or we can 
come in later." Kopp, to support Matkin's statement and to intimidate Moss, said: 
"We can kick in this door," and Matkin advised Moss that he was going to get a 
further legal process, impliedly allowing thern to do so. FAC, U18, R. 134. While 
the Police surveilled the Home, on information and belief, Matkin procured a 
second ex parte private search warrant, expressly directing the Police "to enter 
the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385 North Wall 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103" and, then, "use reasonable force, if necessary 
and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute [the private search warrant] 
including entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, 
and detaining any person who resists enforcement of the [ex parte private search 
warrant]." FAC, ffll 19-22, R. 132. 
10. Matkin returned to Moss' Home with the second ex parte private 
search warrant and Matkin, the Police and two other co-conspirators, all, in a 
deliberate show of force, entered the Home under the threat of kicking in the door 
and "detaining" Moss if she interfered with the warrantless search and seizure. 
FAC, 1| 27, R. 136. 
11. The object of the conspiracy was to misuse the legal processes 
obtained so as to conduct the an illegal search and seizure in furtherance of 
Iorned's ulterior motive. That object was successfully carried out on April 15, 
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2002, when the Police, Matkin and other co-conspirators committed the 
warrantless search and seizure. FAC, If 32, R. 137. Each of the co-conspirators, 
including without limitation the Defendants and the Police, agreed to commit, and 
did commit, one or more acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, in order to allow 
the conspiracy to obtain its object successfully. FAC, If 33, R. 137. 
12. On April 14, 2003, Moss and Yanaki each filed suit against 
Defendants and certain other private co-conspirators in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. Defendants argued in support of a motion to 
dismiss in that action that the search was reasonable. The federal district judge 
held that "ftjhe invasion of Plaintiffs home, supported only by an ex parte 
submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit," was an "unreasonable 
intrusion into a private dwelling that the Fourth Amendment is designed to 
prevent." Yanaki v. lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261,1264 n.7 (D. Utah 2004), 
afTd, 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), cert, denied sub nom. Yanaki v. Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S. Ct. 1910, 164 L. Ed. 
2d 663 (2006). The Defendants in this action did not appeal that holding. FAC, If 
34, R. 137. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Common Law of England for a quarter of a millennium has recognized 
tort claims as the proper means to redress violations of fundamental rights. That 
Common Law was adopted as the law of the State of Utah upon statehood. A 
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warrantless search and seizure, which was the object of the pleaded civil 
conspiracy, is an outrageous violation of the privacy rights afforded the citizens of 
the state of Utah by the warrant requirements of Article 1, section XIV of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as 
applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The violation of the warrant requirements in this case was per se 
unreasonable. Therefore, Plaintiffs have entitlement to redress for their injuries 
under the common law. Once the warrantless search and seizure had occurred, 
Plaintiffs' injuries were complete and they were entitled to assert their common 
law claims. 
The ex parte private search warrants on which Defendants rely do not meet 
the constitutional warrant requirements. Therefore, they afford no justification for 
Defendants' torts regardless of whether their legality was challenged following the 
completed warrantless search and seizure. In addition, the case in which the 
private search warrant was issued was dismissed upon a settlement and in which 
neither Moss nor any Defendants were parties. Any possible appeal issue in that 
case that was moot because the injury was a fait accompli. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals created a new element of the tort of 
abuse of process, namely, that the process used must be illegal. That element is 
contrary to this Court's statements of the essential elements of abuse of process 
and must be reversed. Although the Court of Appeals did not express any view 
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on the remaining bases for the district court's dismissal, none of those provide 
valid alternative grounds for the Court of Appeals to affirm. 
The district court's reliance on judicial privilege failed to address the nature 
of the privilege as applying to defamatory statements, not warrantless searches 
and seizures. The district court's reliance on a first amendment privilege was 
incorrect. Moreover, the district court's Ruling on Motion inappropriately made 
merits-based decisions as a predicate for granting dismissal when the motion 
before it was a pleadings motion. 
Citizens of this state who are subjected to and injured by warrantless, non-
consensual, searches and seizures in private civil litigation must be afforded a 
civil remedy under the common law to redress their injuries, The FAC adequately 
pleaded the elements of and facts supporting common law causes of action to 
obtain such redress. The district court and the Court of Appeals were bound to 
accept as true the pleaded facts in the FAC, a genuine copy of which is attached 
hereto as Appendix 4 and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied if any set of facts 
could be proved in support of plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v. 
Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 965 (Utah 1988)("A motion to dismiss is only 
appropriate where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled 
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to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim."); 
Pett v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 2004 UT App. 150, If 7, 91 P.3d 854, 856. 
Such circumstances, where no set of facts could be proven in support of a 
claim, exist in very narrow circumstances, such as where the claim cannot exist 
as a matter of law, due to preemption, see, e.g., Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1059, (Utah 1991) (negligence claim properly dismissed as 
preempted by Workers' Compensation Statutes), or the absence of statutory 
support for a claim premised on a statute, see Pett, 2004 UT App. 150, at ffif 9-
10,12,91 P.3d at 856-57. 
The correctness review of a district court's decision granting judgment on 
the pleadings is in all respects the same as the review of a decision on a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Golding v. 
Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)(The grant of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the 
grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as 
a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. And in 
considering the factual allegations in the complaint, we take [the pleaded facts] 
as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
a light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Emphasis added.]") Under that 
standard, as shown below, Plaintiffs clearly have stated a claim for relief. 
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II. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO COMMON LAW TORT REDRESS FOR THEIR 
INJURIES CAUSED BY VIOLATIONS OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. 
In Kramer v. Pixton, 72 Utah 1, 268 P. 1029 (1928), this Court stated that 
"[i]t is axiomatic in the law that for every wrong there is a remedy." Id., 72 Utah at 
9, 268 P. at 1032. The Common Law has recognized a right of action for 
violations of fundamental rights for a quarter of a millennium. See Widgeon v. 
Eastern Shore Hospital Center, 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1984): 
One of the earliest cases to illustrate this point was Wilkes v. Wood, 
Lofft's 1, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (1763). In Wilkes, supra, the plaintiff 
recovered damages in a trespass action brought against an official in 
the office of the Secretary of State who entered his home and 
seized his papers upon an unlawful general warrant Lord Pratt, 
in his instructions to the jury, acknowledged that the official had 
acted "contrary to the fundamental principles of the constitution,1' id. 
at 19, [footnote omitted] and stated that the jury could consider the 
illegal conduct in assessing damages. 
Id., 300 Md. at 526, 479 A.2d at 924 (emphasis added). This Common Law 
precedent was binding on the Court of Appeals because the state of Utah 
declared the English Common Law to be binding in its Courts upon statehood. 
See American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40 If 50 & n.17, 557 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, at 10, 13 n.17 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, or 
the constitution and laws of this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts 
of this state." [quoting UTAH REV. STAT. § 2488 (1898)]. 
The FAC in this action pleads injury to Moss and Yanaki based on a 
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violation of their fundamental rights in the form of a warrantless search of their 
Home and seizure of their property in furtherance of a civil conspiracy. The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that persons' homes are the 
subject of especially high expectations of privacy and concomitant protection 
expressly provided by the Fourth Amendment: 
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety 
of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined 
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions 
of an individual's home- a zone that finds its roots in clear and 
specific constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in 
their... houses . . . shall not be violated." That language 
unequivocally establishes the proposition that "[at] the very core [of 
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his 
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion." [Citation omitted.] In terms that apply equally to 
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth 
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L Ed. 
2d 639, 653 (1980)(emphasis added). 
As the ultimate guardian of the fundamental rights of this state's citizens, 
this Court has guaranteed that it is "committed unreservedly to the protection of 
the right of privacy by guarding against any unwarranted intrusions upon the 
peace and dignity of persons in their homes, hotel rooms or wherever they are 
lawfully entitled to be in private." State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 
1977). This right derives from the protections of Section 14, Article I of the 
Constitution of Utah and of Amd't IV of the Constitution of the United States which 
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in identical language provide that The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses — against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated . . . . ' " Id. n.2. 
The fundamental right of privacy in the Home is so jealously guarded in 
this state that this Court has "held that article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth 
Amendment, despite nearly identical language." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 
% 16, 164 P.3d 397,404 (emphasis added). "A warrantless search is perse 
unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the few '"specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions.'"" State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, & 26, 
227 P.3d 1251,1257 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. 
Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973), in turn quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L Ed. 2d 576 (1967)). 
A co-conspirator deputy sheriff threatened to "kick in this door" when Moss 
answered the doorbell in her pajamas and initially refused to allow entry into her 
Home. FAC, fflf 14-18, R. 133-34. No established exception and well delineated 
exception to the constitutional warrant requirements exists to allow entry into a 
private litigant's Home or that allows private counsel to hire the Police in civil 
litigation to conduct warrantless searches and seizures. 
One would be hard pressed to imagine a more outrageous violation of the 
fundamental right to privacy than to have a civil lawyer, with a hired uniformed 
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sheriff with a gun in tow, threatening to kick in one's door and to arrest the 
resident if they get in the way of a warrantless search. If no meaningful redress is 
available to address a violation of the fundamental right of privacy then every civil 
litigant is a potential target of such extreme conduct 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Moss appends preconditions to the ability 
to even plead for such relief that are not found in the essential elements of the 
common law tort claims. The imposition of additional required elements, such as 
establishing illegality of an order or that an order was appealed ignores the 
absence of the required warrant and essentially provides the imprimatur of the 
judiciary to the privacy violation suffered by Moss and Yanaki. This Court must 
remove any hint of such an imprimatur by rejecting the preconditions of the Court 
of Appeals. The rulings of the Court of Appeals and district court offend against 
the remedies that were available in England under the common law. Those 
remedies must be available today to vindicate the legitimacy and vitality of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens expressly by the Utah and United 
States Constitutions. The Court of Appeals' failure to recognize the existence of 
common law redress for a violation of fundamental rights and its affirmance of 
judgment on the pleadings was therefore erroneous and should be reversed with 
direction that the action should proceed in the district court. 
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT Focus ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT, INSTEAD ERRONEOUSLY FOCUSING ON ORDERS THAT DO NOT 
MEET THOSE REQUIREMENTS. 
The Court of Appeals wrote that "[because] each of Plaintiffs' tort claims 
depends upon a determination that the discovery orders were illegal, Plaintiffs' 
claims cannot survive without a determination that the discovery orders were 
illegal." Moss, at fi 9 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals also wrote that 
"Plaintiffs cannot fault Defendants for acting in compliance with the court 
orders." Id. at If 8 (emphasis added). 
These statements miss the point of Plaintiffs' protections under the Utah 
and United States Constitutions and Plaintiffs' concomitant common law right to 
seek redress for their injuries caused by the violation of their fundamental rights. 
A lawful search and seizure may be conducted only pursuant to a warrant or a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. "A warrantless search is per se 
unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the few '"specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions."'" State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, & 26, 
227 P.3d 1251,1257.1 
Process that does not meet the constitutional requirement of a warrant is 
simply not a warrant This is true regardless of whether the process is in other 
defendants' answer did not even allege that the search and seizure were 
so conducted, see R. 149-56, passim, and the FAC expressly pleaded that the 
search and seizure were conducted without a warrant and not subject to any 
recognized exception, FAC fl 3, R. 130. 
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respects legal or illegal. When their Home was invaded and their property taken 
in the absence of a warrant, it is the absence of the warrant that is the violation of 
the fundamental rights. The entire judiciary of this state must be bound by this 
Court's commitment "unreservedly to the protection of the right of privacy[,]" 
Folkes, 565 P.2d at 1127. No order of a district court that is not a warrant can 
overcome the constitutional requirement of a warrant. 
This failure by the Court of Appeals to focus on the pleaded facts which 
should afford a remedy to Plaintiffs is in contravention of Rules 8(a), (e)-(f). 
Those rules require a Court reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings to interpret 
the pleadings so as to afford justice, i.e. a remedy, if any sustainable claim can 
fairly be gleaned from the pleading. See Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 
159, 280 P.2d 453, 454 (1955). 
The fundamental basis underlying all of the claims in the FAC is not the 
illegality of an order, but the illegality of the pleaded warrantless search and 
seizure that violated Moss and Yanaki's fundamental right of privacy, An ex parte 
private search warrant is not the equivalent of a warrant which meets the 
constitutional requirements for a reasonable search, as this Court held seventy 
years ago in Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941). In 
fact, in Allen, this Court expressly outlawed private search warrants. Id. (holding 
unconstitutional under UTAH CONST, ART. I, §§ 14, 24, ART. VI, § 26, that portion of 
the Trade-Marks and Trade Names Act, REV. STAT. UTAH § 95-2-10 (1933) that 
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authorized searches for, and seizures of, knockoff products.) 
This Court carefully analyzed the interests of the state in such an action as 
follows: 
Moreover, it has generally been recognized that the legitimate use 
of the search warrant is restricted to public prosecutions, and 
that in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the 
protection of any mere private right It is a police weapon, and its 
use constitutes a valid exercise of the police power. 
Allen, 110 P.2d at 360 (emphasis added). This Court quoted with approval a 
decision from the New York Court of Appeals: 
Search warrants were never recognized by the common law as 
processes which might be availed of by individuals in the course of 
civil proceedings or for the maintenance of any mere private right; 
but their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted 
and pursued for the suppression of crime or the detection and 
punishment of criminals.... 
AH searches, therefore, which are instituted and pursued upon the 
complaint or suggestion of one party into the house or possessions 
of another, in order to secure a personal advantage, and not with any 
design to afford aid in the administration of justice in reference to 
acts or offenses in violation of penal laws, must be held to be 
unreasonable, and consequently under our Constitution 
unwarrantable, illegal, and void. 
Allen, 110 P.2d at 361 (quoting People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 
797(1913)). 
Further, specifically discussing the interests served by the Trade-Marks 
and Trade Names Act, this Court stated: 'The primary, if not the only purpose of 
such act, . . . appears to be the protection and enhancement of the good-will 
21 
connected with the business of the owner of the mark." 110 P.2d at 361. The Act 
had no connection to criminal prosecutions and the Utah Supreme Court found 
that the Act bore "no actual relationship to the objects sought by the Act in a 
proper exercise of the police power" and found that the search and seizure 
provisions were unreasonable under UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 14. Id. In addition, 
because the Legislature had granted "a special privilege to a special group or 
class of persons, i.e., to those who are owners of trademarks or trade names" this 
Court found that the Act violated the constitutional guarantee against the granting 
of special privileges and for uniform operation of the laws, found in UTAH CONST. 
ART. VI, § 26, See Alien, 110 P.2d at 362. 
This Court agreed with a decision from the Illinois Supreme Court 
concerning a similar statute in Illinois, where it concluded: "The Act is wholly for 
the benefit for the owners of personal property of this class, and is designed to 
give to the owners of personal property of this class rights and privileges not 
possessed by the owners of other classes of other property." Allen, 100 Utah at 
53, 110 P.2d at 363 (quoting Lippman v. People, 175 III. 101, 51 N.E. 872 (1898). 
Thus, this Court and the framers of the Utah Constitution have already 
spoken and determined that there is no public or governmental interest that could 
be served by a law allowing private owners of a particular class of property, here, 
trade secrets, to use the government to conduct searches for their private 
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interest.2 
The foregoing law makes clear that no warrant existed that could meet the 
requirements of the warrant clause in the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
Whether some other order existed is immaterial to the violation of Moss and 
Yanaki's fundamental privacy rights and is material solely to the use of such 
orders to serve an ulterior motive not proper in the proceedings. The dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' action on a pleadings motion is therefore unjustifiable under the 
pleaded facts. The Court of Appeals' affirmance, having been based on the 
existence of an order that was not a warrant, erroneously failed to address the 
gravamen of the action. The Court of Appeals should therefore be reversed with 
direction that the action should proceed in the district court. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ENGRAFTING AN ELEMENT OF ILLEGALITY 
OF PROCESS TO AN ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM. 
Plaintiffs' abuse of process claim was dismissed because the Court of 
Appeals held that the process had to be illegal to support a claim. Moss, fl 9, 237 
P.3d 899, 901 ("Because each of Plaintiffs' tort claims depends upon a 
determination that the discovery orders were illegal, Plaintiffs' claims [including 
2
 Where a law does not expressly authorize a search, the search's illegality 
is even more palpable. Even a concern about destruction of records does not 
justify a court order when the legislature has not deigned to allow such a remedy. 
See Shankman v. Axelrod, 137 A.D.2d 255, 258-59, 528 N.Y. Supp. 2d 937, 938 
(App. Div. 1988) (where statute does not allow expressly examination of records 
or files, it must be assumed that the legislature intended a subpoena to be 
adequate, "it is for the Legislature, not the courts, to fashion such an investigative 
tool, if one is required."). 
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abuse of process] cannot survive without a determination that the discovery 
orders were illegal [emphasis added].") This requirement of illegality of process 
is contrary to this Court's precedent. This Court has held that the essential 
elements of abuse of process require a party to allege: "both [1] 'an ulterior 
purpose' and [2] 'a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular 
conduct of the proceeding.'" Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, fl 36, 147 P.3d 383, 
389 (citations omitted). There is no requirement that the process be illegal or 
invalid in any way. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the ulterior purpose of the defendants was not to 
conduct any legitimate discovery, as ostensibly proposed, but rather to conduct a 
raid on Yanaki's Home to instill fear in lomed's remaining employees. FAC.ffll 7-
9, R. 131. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants, as co-conspirators, wilfully used that 
process in the course of the warrantless search and seizure, a process not proper 
in the regular conduct of proceedings. FAC, fflf 14-20, 27-33, 42-46, R. 133-34, 
136-37,139-40. Whether the process on its face was legal or illegal, it was 
misused to conduct a warrantless search and seizure. The Court of Appeals' 
requirement that Moss and Yanaki establish that the process was illegal in order 
to adequately plead an abuse of process claim must be reversed and the case 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
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V. THE COURT OF APPEALS PRECONDITION THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE PRIVATE 
SEARCH WARRANTS BE APPEALED FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE 
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS ALSO ERRONEOUS. 
When it failed to focus on the warrantless search and seizure that 
constitute the violation of fundamental rights, the Court of Appeals also 
erroneously focused on the "failure" to appeal the issuance of the private search 
warrants that do not in any event meet the constitutional warrant requirement. 
See supra Part II. 
Even if the orders actually issued by the district court were material to 
Plaintiffs' claims, however (and with the exception of abuse of process they are 
not), there could be no requirement that Moss and Yanaki appeal those private 
search warrants. Moss, for example, was not a party to that action at any time. 
No claims were asserted against her and she had no standing to appear in that 
action. Moss was simply the private citizen who was present and who viewed the 
warrantless invasion of her Home. It is worthy of emphasis in this respect that 
the FAC pleads that Moss, "[a]fter reading portions of the Search Order and 
seeing that is was directed to Yanaki. . . advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki 
was not Home and she would not allow them in her Home without Yanaki being 
present." FAC, If 17, R. 134. It was only after the Police threatened to kick in the 
front door to her Home and to detain (i.e. arrest) her that she afforded entry to the 
conspirators. FAC, ffi[ 18, 22, R. 134-35. 
Further, the action in which the private search warrants were issued was 
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dismissed with prejudice based on a settlement, R. 545, so any potential for 
appeal was mooted. Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Smith, 2002 UT 49, ^  3, 
48 P.3d 976, 977 ("Moreover, 'where the actions of the parties themselves cause 
a settling of their differences, the case becomes moot,' and 'an appeal will be 
dismissed as moot where the matter raised was settled by agreement, such as by 
. . . voluntary dismissal of a claim.' [citing 5 A M . JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 654 
(1995)]"). 
Moreover, no relief was available to Moss or Yanaki by objecting to the 
district court or appealing to the appellate court regarding the issuance of the 
private search warrants. That civil process had been completely executed and 
the injury was a fait accompli the morning that the warrantless search and seizure 
occurred. The injury caused by the violation of the fundamental right to Moss and 
YanakPs privacy could not be undone by any further action of the district court or 
the appellate court. 
This Court has previously recognized the axiom that "[t]he law does not 
require useless acts." Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 277, 233 P.2d 365, 373 
(1951)(quoting Paxton v. Deardon, 94 Utah 149, 158, 76 P. 2d 561, 564 (1938). 
Requiring an appeal, following a settlement, of the interlocutory issuance of ex 
parte orders which had been fully executed by invading Moss and Yanaki's 
privacy is not only useless, but such a requirement also has a chilling effect on 
potential settlements. Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 536, 766 N.E.2d 482, 
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491 (2002)("When a party settles, he loses both the opportunity and incentive to 
appeal. When the losing party foregoes the right to challenge the ruling because 
a settlement is in his best interest, it would be unfair to bar the party from 
relitigating the determination in subsequent proceedings against different 
parties.") The Defendants here were not parties to the lomed litigation, so the 
Jarosz rule is apt. 
As to the Court of Appeals' application of conclusive effect under the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 11 cmt. a [hereinafter Restatement] 
and associated Utah cases concerning collateral attacks on final judgments, that, 
too, was error. The propriety of the issuance of the interlocutory, ex parte private 
search warrants was never fully and fairly litigated. Yanaki was never heard on 
the issue in the lomed case because both orders were obtained ex parte and 
then fully executed before his return to Utah or the effectuation of service of 
process upon him. 
In those circumstances, it is not Restatement §11, cited by the Court of 
Appeals, see Moss, % 9, 237 P.3d at 901, which governs, but rather Restatement 
§13. Restatement § 13 says "final judgment' includes any prior adjudication of 
an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be 
accorded conclusive effect." Id. (emphasis added). A lack of adequate 
deliberation (as necessarily occurs in an interlocutory, ex parte approach) would 
prevent preclusive effect. "Before [applying preclusive effect], the court should 
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determine that the decision to be carried over was adequately deliberated and 
firm, even if not final in the sense of forming a basis for a judgment already 
entered." Id. cmt. g (emphasis added). 
So not only does this Court's decision in Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co. 
concerning mootness stand in the way of the Court of Appeals' ruling on the 
conclusive nature of final judgments, the absence of a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate, public policy and the correct section of the Restatement on 
conclusiveness of final judgments do as well. 
VI. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY PLEADS TORT CLAIMS 
FOR RELIEF BASED ON THE CONDUCT OF THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
A. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Abuse of Process. 
"A claim for abuse of process requires the plaintiff to show (1) that the 
defendant used legal process, (2) to accomplish an improper purpose or purpose 
for which that process was not designed, (3) causing the plaintiff's harm." 
Mountain West Surgical Center, LLC. v. Hospital Corporation of Utah, 2007 UT 
92, atU 11, 173 P.3d 1276, 1278. The FAC plainly pleads each of these 
elements. 
For example, Plaintiffs allege "misuse [of] a legal process . . . by the 
[Police], [Matkin] and certain unnamed co-conspirators." FAC, fl 3, R. 130. 
Plaintiffs then allege that Defendants used yet another legal process relating to 
their search and seizure, providing yet another basis for abuse of process. See 
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FAC Tffl 27-28, R. 136. Plaintiffs allege an ulterior motive in the abusive use of 
process: "lomed desired to misuse a legal process to cause an illegal raid on the 
Home as a form of message to its employees that they would be better off signing 
new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided." FAC, H 
8,R. 131. 
FAC Count II, Abuse of Process, R. 139-140, incorporates all of the 
foregoing and more predicate acts constituting the consummation of the 
conspiratorial scheme to assist lomed in its ulterior motivation for misusing the 
legal processes obtained and resulting in injury to plaintiffs. These include 
threats to Moss to kick in the door of her house. FAC Tf 18, R. 134 and threats to 
strip her of her liberty by "detaining" her, FAC ffl 22, 27-29, R. 135-136 all of 
which was to establish a threat of intimidation to use against current lomed 
employees. 
Each of the plaintiffs was injured by this extraordinary abuse and use of 
civil process, in the deprivation of their privacy, emotional well-being and physical 
well-being caused by the acts of the conspirators. FAC fflj 46-47, R. 139-140. A 
cognizable claim has thus been pleaded. 
B. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Invasion of Privacy. 
In order to prevail on their invasion of privacy claim, plaintiffs "must prove 
two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was 'an 
intentional substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
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seclusion of the complaining party,' and (2) that the intrusion 'would be highly 
offensive to the reasonable person.'" Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 
P.2d 374, 378 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Plaintiffs plead the awakening of Moss in 
her Home, the threat to kick in the front door to her Home and the threat to detain 
(i.e. arrest) her, followed by the non-consensual invasion and search of Moss and 
Yanaki's Home, surveillance of the Home and seizure of both Moss and Yanaki's 
property, FAC fflf 14-31, R. 133-137. These pleaded facts provide fair notice to 
any reasonable person of an intentional, substantial intrusion upon the seclusion 
of plaintiffs that is extremely outrageous. The elements of the claim are pleaded 
in FAC ffif 48-53, R. 140-141. A claim has been stated. 
C. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress. 
In order to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must 
show: "(i) the [defendant's] conduct [complained of] was outrageous and 
intolerable in that it offended . . . generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality; (ii) [the defendant] intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of 
the likelihood of causing, emotional distress; (iii) [the plaintiff] suffered severe 
emotional distress; and (iv) [the defendant's] conduct proximately caused [the] 
emotional distress." Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins, Co.y 2002 UT 68, fl 37, 56 
P,3d 524, 535. Again, all elements are met by the warrantless search and 
seizure. The conspirators plainly intended to instill fear by their threat of violence 
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in kicking in the door to the home, their threat to detain Moss, their surveillance of 
the Home and through its ultimate invasion. The conspirators seized property 
that did not belong to them and hauled it away. The ulterior motive was to instill 
fear in lomed employees, so the intent to instill fear in Moss and Yanki is 
reasonably inferable as well. There could be little more disturbing to any person 
than the conduct exhibited by the conspirators in this case. Plaintiffs pleaded that 
the conduct of the conspirators in fact caused them severe emotional distress, 
even causing physical injury in Yanaki's case. FAC fflj 54-61, R. 141-142. A 
claim has been stated. 
D. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Trespass to Land and Chattels. 
The gist of an action of trespass is infringement on the right of 
possession." John Price Associates, Inc. v. Utah State Conference, Bricklayers 
Locals Nos. 1,2&6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1980). The FAC pleads that 
plaintiffs "were, at all times material hereto, lawfully in possession of the Home 
and its contents," FAC H 63, R. 142. The FAC further pleads that the "invasion of 
the Home" and "the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as 
well as Yanaki's confidential medical records, was a trespass to land and 
chattels." FAC fl64, R. 142. Again, a claim has been stated. 
E. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Conversion. 
Conversion requires "an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods 
inconsistent with the owner's rights." Alfred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 
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726, 728 (Uiaii i ^ u ; Tne Co:nt for conversion incorporates all prior allegation 
and specifically alleges: "Matkin, ii i "i i n therance of the conspiracy, converted 
plaintiffs' chattels with at i ii itei it to deprive plaintiffs of their possession or use for 
a period of time." I-AC, ffij 68, 70, R. 143 ^ [legations of dcmmion e^.d control 
-nip met hy ll>' FAC's pk-*nriino offing warrantless seir .:. " \C r :> K. 142 and 
intent is adequately pleaded in paragraph 70. See UTAH - C- . -* ^ bx '"Malice, 
ii rtent, kno1* a ledge, ai id ::>tl iei coi iclitioi i of i i lir id " ~" 3d 
general ly.") . . . . 
F. "I 
"•jo prove civil conspiracy, five elements must; be shown: l(i) a combination 
of two or more persons, "(2) an object to be accomplisl led, (3) a r i leeti-
 ;r 
minds on the object or course of action,. (4) one or n lore unlawful, oven acts and 
(5) damages as a proximate result tl iei eof, ' Alta Industries, Ltd, \ i* iurst, 846 
" ' " •"" '-
 tJtah 1993)(quoting Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 
P.2d 785, r.
 sj\b\\ ^ App. 1987)), I ! le FAC pleads "This case arises out of a 
— ••-' -lisuse a - wocess and to cause an illegal search of 
the Home •<-J seizure c~ wow h merl in oy tl le [Police), [IWlatkin] and certain 
5
 • " - • *•. - n e ; :onspired with 
• : :amec aeiencEims :o cause me misuse or • \ega proc-^So and the Illegal 
'.jearcli am I r i i i i ie h IIr- P'4« >" piii uin • ' r- ' -
co-conspirators, some of whom are the named defendants herein, committed the 
torts alleged herein. The details are set forth below." FAC fl4, R. 130. Co-
conspirator lomed's ulterior motive is pleaded: "Yanaki had left lomed's 
employment approximately three months before the Search Motion was filed. 
Co-conspirator lomed was, during the material time period surrounding the filing 
of the Search Motion, seeking to get its employees to sign new forms of 
non-compete agreements. Co-conspirator lomed desired to misuse a legal 
process to cause an illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its 
employees that they would be better off signing new agreements than leaving 
and risking their own homes being raided. The ulterior motive of misusing legal 
process to conduct the warrantless search of the Home and seizure was thus 
designed to put an exclamation point on the dangers to lomed employees of 
leaving lomed rather than signing the new form of agreements." FAC ^ 8, R. 131 
A specific agreement between lomed and the Defendants to further the 
conspiracy is pleaded: "Defendants agreed to help their client, lomed, place such 
exclamation point by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and 
seizure by the police, and by using the diversionary approach to the state judge 
of ostensibly protecting trade secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, 
rather than what they were really doing, namely, seeking to have the Police 
conduct an illegal raid." FAC If 9, R. 131. Culpable knowledge on the part of 
defendants is pleaded: "However, as defendants knew, UTAH CODE ANN. § 
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77-23-204(2)(a) [2003]3 expressly limits the class of applicants for a search 
warrant to a 'peace office! 01 prosecuting attorney;11" I he defendants knew they 
IN n?t fit int'" '-'i1har such ' i i ^ "" P^C 110, R, 132; see also FAC ffil 11-13, R. 
132-133. In addition to Co-conspirator lomed's ulterior motivation, a specific, 
•nspiracy w as described in FAC fl 3?, P \ 17 Fach of the 
conspirators is pied to have undertaken one or more acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, FAC"1) | / 8, R Il«!: I I, I h ila> < II i ill acts, il1 i tl le foi i i i • ::: • j n d w r l , imi 
pleaded torts, see above, were pleaded to have been committed in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. Plaintiffs pleaded that the conspiracy was the cause-in-tact and 
legal cai jse of damages to then i. FAC % 79-80, R. 143-144. Again, a cognizable 
claim was stated. • • 
11
 III I HE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMANCE OF I HE DISTRICT COURT WAS 
ALSO ERRONEOUS BECAUSE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRORS. 
A
 The District Court Improperly Made Merits Rulings on a 
Pleadings Motion, 
The Court: of Appeals itself has warned against the general impropriety of 
dismissing actions at the pleadings stage on affirmath re defenses, Foi e> lai i iple, 
3The statute that was in effect at that time, since repealed, read: The 
gi ounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursuant to Subsection 
(2) shall be those required by this chapter, Prior to issuance of the warrant, the 
magistrate shall require the peace officer or the prosecuting attorney who is 
requesting the warrant to read to him verbatim the contents of the warrant." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204(2)(a) (2003)(emphasis added). Therefore, the 
statutory law was clear that only peace officers or prosecutors could request a 
warrant. 
the Court of Appeals has stated: "While Utah law recognizes a qualified privilege 
of the sort Uintah raises as a defense to Zoumadakis's claim of defamation, see 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991), in the posture the trial 
court dismissed her defamation claim, i.e., on a rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to 
state a claim, the trial court jumped the gun in concluding the privilege was 
dispositive." Id. The Court of Appeals continued its criticism of the tactic of 
raising affirmative defenses in the context of a motion to dismiss: 
In light of our analysis, it was not necessary for Zoumadakis to 
amend her complaint to include allegations anticipating and rebutting 
Uintah's claimed qualified privilege. In fact, the record shows that 
Uintah has not even properly pleaded privilege as an affirmative 
defense in answer to Zoumadakis's complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(c). Instead, Uintah raised the issue for the first time in support of 
its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Raising an affirmative defense, like a 
qualified privilege, for the first time in a 12(b)(6) motion is not 
generally appropriate since "dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is 'justified 
only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate 
that the plaintiff does not have a claim."' Tucker v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, P7, 53 P.3d 947 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). Thus, "affirmative defenses, which often raise 
issues outside of the complaint, are not generally appropriately 
raised in a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)." Id. Consequently, 
in the context of Uintah's 12(b)(6) motion, the burden of proving the 
abuse of any qualified privilege was not yet on Zoumadakis. The trial 
court should only have considered whether her complaint stated a 
claim upon which relief could be granted based on the allegations of 
the complaint itself, and not based on any possible affirmative 
defenses. 
/of. at 895 n.6. These criticisms of this practice are especially pertinent to the 
district court's dismissal of the pleaded claims here based on affirmative 
defenses. 
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The district court made several rulings on the merits when the merits were 
not before it. For example, the district court recognized that "the one offensive 
Parr Waddoups." Ruling on Motion, at R. 465 -emphasis added), It is not the 
pi ei ogative ol tl \e disti ict coi »i 1: t :> decide wh : i I lUiul nialioi 11, offensir. n 
The trier of fact must determine whether a warrantless search and seizure of 
Plaintiffs' Home is offensive an 1 ::i I ic: \ \ offensive it is. 
The district court also ruled, again on the merits, that the discovery 01 der • 
was Intended to affect Moss minii 1 laily." Rulii lg 01 1 Motioi i, at R. 46 ; , Assuming 
arguendo that such intent is material (and it is not) the district court does not have 
the role of divining that intent. The statement also flies in the face of the pleaded 
motivation that lorned wanted essentially a terroristic episode against \ anaki to 
mist:1 in com incing its other employees to sicin now '.Tviployrnenl agreements. 
' The district court made another merits ruling: The Parr Waddoups lawyer •• 
•-:s:r.ct court, aga<^ •<• r . " : * 'e -:r - oleadincs motion wra" ** -
lawyer did 01 did 1 not do. Sevei al excesses are cleai irrnn the pleaded facts 
concerning conduct even the private search warrant did not pi irport to authorize, 
such as; (1) a physical tl n eat to kid (in the door to tl le Home; (2) implying to Moss 
that a warrantless search of her Home could be legitimately conducted; and (3) 
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seizing property that belonged to Moss and Yanaki, rather than lomed. 
The district court also made merits rulings on the reasonableness of 
warrantless search and seizure, somehow finding in the pleadings a basis to rule 
that "If Yanaki had indeed stolen trade secrets and they were on his computer, he 
would have ample opportunity to hide the material or destroy it. There is little 
reason to suppose that a person who would steal such things would not hide 
them or destroy them to avoid being finding out." Ruling on Motion, at R. 466. 
This ruling assumed that Yanaki was guilty of stealing trade secrets in the 
underlying action, again a merits-based decision. This ruling was reached even 
though Yanaki's counsel pointed out that the President and Chief Executive 
Officer of lomed had, in his deposition in the lomed case, confessed that the 
"Confidential New Product" which Yanaki had been accused of stealing could not, 
at the time of the President's deposition, be drawn by him or any other person at 
lomed because it was just a "product concept" and not something that could even 
be drawn. See Deposition of RobertJ. Lollini, 3/11/03, at 267:2-4, R. 608 (sealed) 
at 50. Further, is such evidence had actually existed, Defendants could have 
avoided the Home invasion and instead obtained it from the co-defendant 
Ceramatec, Inc.'s business premises. 
B. Judicial Privilege Cannot, on the Pleadings (Or Otherwise), 
Shield Defendants from Liability. 
Defendants are not being sued for making any defamatory statements or 
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for making any filings with a court. They are being sued for violating Plaintiffs' 
fundamental rights of privacy and for misusing court processes for ulterior 
motives foi v h r h !h,:iy ",pf^ npf Hesiqnpri i r h i|nn !,c "onspirator iomed to 
send a message to its remaining employees to sign new employment contracts 
rather than leave • . • • . . • 
In O'Connor v. Bumingham, 20CT UT 58, 165 P.3d 1214, ±'s Cou ; 
explici * ~ - ;v'fed elenie - * 
the judicial proceedings privilege in this state: 
The judicial proceeding privilege has three elements. First, the 
alleged defamatory statement must have been made during oi ii 
the course of a judicial proceeding. Second, the statement must 
have some reference to the proceeding's subject matter, Third, the 
party claiming the privilege must have been acting in the capacity of 
a judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel in the proceeding at the 
time of the alleged defamation, 
0'Conner, 2007 UT 58, U 31, 165 P.3d at 1222^23 (emphasis added), At the 
soi e :i)f each c f • .. . - -* \\ 
proceedings privicge .s tne requirement that l :r « - o e j . ^ a ^ a i c ' v s ta ierenf 
M< in it™" w in i\ ui ami ui ili»- i iijiiiiiii ii MI is i ii III i lie: |iiuii i-ii |iiui eedinys pfMiiiHii- in n 
;->e aoolied. No such defamatory statement is at the center of any claim- in this 
Defendants had cited earlier cases on judicial proceedings privilege to the 
district court if t their effoi t to i lave it i each a different coi icli ision. But those cases 
a s Wei| all involve statements which are defamatory in nature and so plaintiffs 
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seek relief for the damage caused, directly or indirectly, to their reputations. 
Defendants cited Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, 
70 P.3d 17, for the proposition that u[t]he Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 
rule in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b, that 'there is no action for 
abuse of process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is 
intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit 
to the defendant'" That may be true, but Defendants missed the point that the 
discovery process in civil litigation was never intended for the purpose of allowing 
warrantless searches and seizures of homes. 
Bennett more correctly stands for the proposition that "[a] plaintiff may state 
a cause of action for abuse of process against a person "' who uses a legal 
process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not 
designed."'" Bennett, 2003 UT 9 fl 47, 70 P.3d at 28. Defendants purported to 
use the civil discovery process, although it does not (and could not) authorize 
warrantless searches and seizures. Defendants actually conspired to use their 
orders for the purpose of justifying a warrantless search and seizure so that their 
client could intimidate its remaining employees. That is actionable under 
Bennett4 
4
 Defendants also cited below to Waiters v. Dinn, 633 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1994). That case is likewise inapposite. The process at issue in that case 
was a subpoena served to obtain records in discovery. See id. at 288-89. While 
the subpoena was defective in its form, there is no comparison between the use 
(continued...) 
39 
Nevertheless, defendants' argued below: "Courts have repeatedly held 
that the judicial proceedings privilege precludes claims like those presented here 
based or 
assistance ana c::ia!Pec v * j . zyjr: j'ier6 De*encsn:s Ooen^a 
III i lomorandurn, at 5 leiru 
cited cases even involved a search and seizure.5 Defendants asserted that Foi TO 
4(. ..continued) 
of a recognized and legitimate discovery tool and a warrantless search and 
seizure. 
5The remaining cases cited by Defendants did not coi ne close to 
mentioning the issue. Plaintiffs have no quarrel with the genera! propositions that 
a privilege exists to make defamatory statements ii 1 litigation, that the privilege is 
absolute, that it protects witnesses, lawyers, parties and judges from liability for 
making defamatory statements or that the privilege lasts throughout the entire 
litigation, which are propositions for which three Utah cases cited by Defendants 
stand, namely, Riddle v, Perry, 2002 UT 10, 40 P.3d 1128; DeBry\ '. Godbe, 1999 
UT 111, 992 P.2 979; Beezleyv. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 288 P.2d 1057 (1955). 
Nor do Plaintiffs quarrel with the general proposition that the privilege bars all 
claims for injury caused by the defamatory statement, whether sounding in 
defamation, intentional interference or otherwise, for which the Utah case of Price 
v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997), cited by Defendants stands, The 
warrantless entry into a home, search thereof and seizure of property is not, 
however, a "publication" of "defamatory statements" with which the cited cases 
were concerned. See Riddle, 2002 UT 10 at U 4, 40 P.3d at 1131 ("The 
defamatory statement at issue in this case . " Emphasis added.); DeBry, • • 
1999 UT 111 at If 4, 992 P.2d at 982 ("'Ms. DeBry's attorney, Clark Sessions," 
responded by letter to Judge Wilkinson the following day, stating that Godbe's 
letter was an attempt "to demean, libel and defame Ms. DeBry.m" Emphasis 
added.); Beezieyf 4 Utah 2d at 88, 286 P.2d at 1058 ("The publication of 
defamatory matter by an attorney is protected . . ,." (stated in context of lawyer 
being sued for publishing slanderous statement about opposing party to client)); 
and Price, 949 P.2d at 1253 ("Price filed a civil complaint based on these 
comments in state court on June 18, 1996, against Armour and the Union, 
(continued...) 
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Precision, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 
1982), is "based on allegations that attorneys conducted improper discovery with 
police assistance and obtained unlawful court orders." See Defendants' Opening 
Memorandum, at 5, R. 258. 
A careful reading of that case shows the assertion to be plainly wrong. 
Forro Precision (1) did not involve the conduct of "improper discovery," (2) did not 
involve "unlawful court orders" and (3) most certainly did not involve a warrantless 
search of a private home by a private attorney and his hired Police. Forro 
Precision in fact applied a privilege to make defamatory statements to the police 
to initiate a criminal investigation, but only as to statements made to the police. 
See id. at 1055. 
The judicial proceedings privilege was addressed under California's 
particular judicial privilege statute, which provides a far broader privilege than 
Utah's defense of privilege. IBM went to the Santa Clara County police and 
made statements to the California Attorney General to have them initiate a 
criminal investigation. Id. at 1051. The Court quoted the California statute 
concerning privileged statements: "'A privileged publication or broadcast is one 
made-... 2. In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other 
5(...continued) 
alleging libel, libel per se, and intentional interference with business relations." 
[Emphasis added.]) A non-consensual warrantless search of Plaintiffs' Home is 
simply not a statement, let alone a defamatory statement, to which the judicial 
proceedings privilege applies. 
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official proceeding authorized by law .. .."" Id. at 1055. The Court recognized 
under the applicable third prong6 that "the privilege applies to communications 
designed to j: i c n >pt officials to initiate proceedings as well as to communications 
-. f r.:r^g the course of proceedings," The Court concluded under that statute 
: .- : -' i| , fs. rommunioalions to llm1" anlhoiifies ' were prn 'ileged," Id al 1056. 
Therefore fre For" Precision case, read correctly, actually supports 
* ^nai investigs"ic * — Ari sear M W-. a^ - ^ciuest D^  T~:~ 
communications at all over which Defendants are being sued, In sum, Form 
Precision does not stand for the proposition that Defendants have some privilege 
to conduct a warrantless search of Plaintiffs* Home. 
The other case supporting the assertion below by Defendants of the 
" - * * — * * " ~ ^laware 
i •; "ansoian: r'rograr c,:L ra i>jr>er 62- 5J9A.2d 1^7^938 
6
 It is apparent that the Court is discussing the thii d prong by its statement of tl i $ 
applicable policy: "Underlyii ig the privilege is the policy of encouraging freedom of 
communication between citizens and public authorities charged with investigating 
wrongdoing." Id 
7
 Defendants argued that ct[o]ther jurisdictions similarly apply the judicial 
proceedings privilege to bar a wide range of tort ciaims[,] Opening Mem. at 4, R. 
257, without specifying that such claims are, in each instance they cited, 
premised on defamatory statements. Lambdin Funeral Service, Inc. v. Griffith, 
559 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. 1978), stands for the proposition, according to 
(cor itii iued.. ) 
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Brown, the judicial proceedings privilege was applied to protect a hospital's 
7(...continued) 
defendants, that no invasion of privacy action could be brought against them for 
conducting an illegal search and seizure. In fact, the Lambdin Funeral Service 
court expressed that the tort claims barred by the privilege were alleged to arise 
from the publication of defamatory statements, not an invasion of privacy by 
virtue of unlawful entry into a home. See id. at 792 ("In the instant case, each tort 
charged in the complaint is predicated upon the publication by the defendant of 
alleged acts of misconduct by the plaintiff."). In Middlesex Concrete Prods. & 
Excav. Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 58 N.J. Super. 85, 172 A.2d 22 (1961), 
following litigation, a testifying expert was sued for his statements made to his 
client while he was merely a consulting expert concerning a dispute between his 
client and Middlesex. The Court held that the communications with his client 
concerning the dispute but before he knew he would be a testifying expert were 
privileged, so could not form the basis of an intentional interference claim. In 
Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 (Cal. 
1990)(en banc), the Court held only that a divorce attorney's statement "as to [a] 
psychologist's neutrality and independence were privileged under [the Code]." 
Id,, 50 Cal.3d at 219-20, 786 P.2d 374, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48. This holding 
was simply consistent with the Court's prior statement that the privilege 
"immunizes] participants from liability for torts arising from communications made 
during judicial proceedings . ..." Id., 50 Cal.3d at 214, 786 P.2d at 370, 266 Cal. 
Rptr. at 643. Finally, the case of Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal.App.2d 80, 53 
Cal.Rptr. 706 (1966), did not purport to abolish the tort of abuse of process 
because all process is obtained through judicial proceedings. To the contrary, 
although California takes an extremely narrow view of the tort, the judicial 
proceedings privilege has been declared not to apply to actions where the 
gravamen of the action is the conduct of enforcement of an order or judgment, 
rather than the communications to procure the order or judgment in the first 
instance. See Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1065, 128 P.3d 713, 724, 39 
Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 529 (2006)("Here, because the execution of the judgment did 
not provide an independent basis for liability separate and apart from the filing of 
the false declarations of service, the gravamen of the action was the procurement 
of the judgment, not its enforcement. Thus, the enforcement of the judgment in 
reliance on the filing of privileged declarations of service was itself privileged.") 
Thus, even under a narrow interpretation never asserted in Utah of the abuse of 
process tort, a claim over an illegal entry into plaintiffs' home, would survive. 
What the Defendants communicated to the court in advance of their warrantless 
search and seizure is not what Plaintiffs here complain about. 
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lawyer from liability for filing a judicial petition on behalf of the hospital which 
sought ai i 01 der allowing the hospital to ex tract the organs of a brain-dead man 
w l 1 o m j t [iacj '[3een u n ak|e i0 identify, for use in transplants. 539 A.2d at1373. A 
claim by the decedent's relatives for malicious use of process had been 
'-•=-- •* • * . . • - - , ~-T- ? ^ lajpp because the 
0'D:essvi;U *r r-ez agairs: 3i^: y r e plaintiffs. r36A.aa t13 4. 
- • - ; - - . - . - • • - • not stai id foi 
any proposition as to whether the judicial proceedings privilege would appl\ to 
against the lawyer for munianc^ : / a jorose, civil conspiracy, and assault and 
battery, evei i th:*. r .-.. - ned the decede . -. .-. 
In that limited contex4 ^>- r>= - - )jed that the judicial proceedings r ' i - j o 
protected the lawyei froi i i liability ' for filing a judicial petition, even thougt i there 
was no defamatory statement, because preparation and filing of the petition is ail 
the lawyer did, Id., 539 A.2d at 1374 ("[T]he well-pleaded averments indicate that 
/ ftnrney Henri1?* only involvement in the case was his pi eparation of the petition 
pursuant to his client's instructions, ai id that all the allegations against Heed are 
i elied on Pennsylvania precedent, stating; "The inn i tunity bars actions for tortious 
communication pertinent to any stage of a judicial proceeding, Thus, the 
1 1 
privilege barred claims for intentional interference with contractual or prospective 
contractual relations, as well as defamation. 539 A.2d at 1374-75 (emphasis 
added). 
In contrast to Defendants' arguments below about the judicial proceedings 
privilege barring any such claims, Courts have recognized the existence of 
common law tort claims arising out of warrantless searches. In Walsh v. Erie 
County Department of Job and Family Services, 240 F. Supp.2d 731 (N.D. Ohio 
2003), the plaintiff alleged that an illegal, warrantless search of a private home by 
a state agency was extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to pursue a claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 The Court, applying Ohio law that 
appears substantially identical to Utah law, see id. at 766, denied a motion for 
summary judgment, stating: "A reasonable juror, being apprized of the pertinent 
Fourth Amendment legal doctrines, including the basic sanctity of the home and 
the right to be free from unjustified intrusion, and, as well, the constitutional 
defendants claimed below that Yanaki could not sue under this tort 
because he was not present. This ignores the substantial emotional distress that 
defendants knew they would cause from the fact of the search, itself, let alone 
when Yanaki found out how his wife had been mistreated and threatened during 
the process, in Hatch v Davis, 2006 UT44, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, the Utah 
Supreme Court, although recognizing its preference for presence and setting the 
bar high for a non-present plaintiff, rejected an absolute requirement that a 
plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress be present to state a 
claim. See id. 2006 UT 44 If 32, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28 ("Yet the door to 
recovery remains open for the case where conduct is so egregious that the 
plaintiffs circumstances cry out for relief."). Thus, all of the relevant facts must be 
placed before the trier of fact, something a pleading motion does not do. 
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protection otherwise given to the family, could view the threats of taking the 
cl lildren away, the arrest, ensuing ei it! ) into the home, and the searches o1 " IIV Ii ".. 
Walsh and the family home to have been outrageous " id. The pleaded fads in 
this case clearly give rise to questions for the trier of fact to answer about whether 
the conduct complained of in invadi*^ *~e home wmie Moss was home alone, 
illegally., with threats of violence ar:i ~ ^iow of forcc for an illegal purpose, 
constitute extreme and oi itragr- 3 ji; iclcmnent on 1he pleadings 
--. defense of privilege was tnerefo:*e erv - • 
( rhe First Amendu Lieleiulanla /• yaiiiiisJ 
Plaintiffs' Claims, 
Defendants are not being sued because they petitioned their government 
search and seizure, for their abuse of judicial process and for frightening Moss 
9indeedr this Court's own precedent suggests the ultimate viability of 
Plaintiffs' claims despite the judicial proceedings privilege where something moi e 
than the filing of pleadings and papers was involved. In Bennett, "'[according to 
Bennett's own pleadings, the Jones Waldo defendants1 bar order related conduct 
was not "intentionally engaged in ... with the purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress,'" 2003 UT 9, % 69, 70 P.3d at 33, The Bennett Court did not exclude the 
possibility that if more occurred than simply the filing of suit and use of process, 
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim could be stated. Anderson 
Development Co, LC. v, Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323 supports this 
principle in its ruling: "As stated above, without more, neither the filing of a 
lawsuit nor the improper use of the legal process is sufficient to support a claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress," Id., ff 56, 116 P.3d at 339 
(emphasis added), In this case, the threats to kick in the door to the Home and to 
arrest Moss, under the circumstances alleged, are much more, as was 
recognized by the Court in 1 Walsh. 
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into opening the door to her Home, through which they passed without lawful 
consent, invaded the Home of the Plaintiffs and stole Plaintiffs' property. The 
district court held that Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955), 
authorized this misconduct. Beezley, however, had nothing to do with the First 
Amendment Instead, it simply recognized that the judicial privilege applies to 
communications in demand letters preliminary to litigation. See Beezley, 286 
P.2d at 1057-58. 
Defendants actually cited the district trial court to Searle v. Johnson, 709 
P.2d 328 (Utah 1985), as recognizing the limitations the First Amendment places 
on state law tort claims. However, the facts of Searle are remarkably different. 
There, plaintiffs, who owned a business in Uintah County, sued a group of 
political activists who conducted a media campaign urging a tourist boycott of 
Uintah County because they wanted to effect improvements in conditions at a 
local dog pound. See id. at 328-29. Finding an insufficient governmental interest 
in restricting the peaceful political activity of the defendants, the Court held that 
the First Amendment protected politically-motivated speech of the defendants. 
See id. at 330. 
The warrantless search of Moss and Yanaki's Home does not involve 
politically-motivated speech. This Court has in fact never extended First 
Amendment immunity beyond politically-motivated petitions. In Anderson 
Development Co., LC. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323, a case also cited to 
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the district court below by Defendants, recounted the development of the 
privilege: "0 ^ erthe years, com ts have exter ided ti lis in n i: in n fity do ::ti in le, i eferred 
t0 as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, see R A \ i ' City of Si Paul, 505 U.S. 377', 
420, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 LEd.2cl 305 ( 1992), to 'pi otect political acti\ ity 
agains ^s as well as antitrust claims,' Searie v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 
684 (Utah r. . ' ;* ?™r ',T" 45 at fl 26, 115 P 3d at 332. 
DeT- ----- —• " -Kftioto-' ~ ;1- ~ase nl Grotty Horn I 16 
T
 3d 3S7 :* s:~ Cr 2, \ \ : - as suea izr supplying s z'ooaoie csj^e 
analysis of the abuse of process claim there focused on whether there were 
were false, not on the merits of the underlying action. See id, at 915, Further, oi i 
Scott's False Imprisonme - -, cognized ti at tl le tort's 
element of illegality "efferiv^ ! r r ° -e- !- -j-v infringement on or chilling of Hern's 
First Amendment rights by the ir.^ .c; C*J , . . . . too, here, does the 
illegality of Defendants' conduct prevent any in£-^o--mer.: >n c: chilling of their 
First Amendment rights, so there is no First Amendment privilege. Jt ,iKe effect 
j s a n o t h e r c a s e Defendants cited to the district court, Protect Our Mountain 
Environment, Inc \ '. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo, 1984)(en banc). I he 
' Yiurf there state 1 "The right lo petition government, however, is not without 
limits, The First Amendment does not grant a license to use the courts for 
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improper purposes." Id. at 1366.10 Warrantless searches and seizures cannot be 
characterized as proper, by their very illegal nature. There simply is no 
infringement on or chilling of Defendants' First Amendment rights that results 
from suing them here. 
In short, no case has held that a First Amendment right exists to conduct a 
warrantless search and seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
The warrantless search and seizure deprived Plaintiffs of their fundamental 
right to privacy. The common law affords them redress in tort. Defendants 
abused the process of the Court that they did obtain by obtaining it for an ulterior 
purpose and using it in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceeding. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals affirming the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings be 
[THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
10
 The Colorado court did adopt a singular procedure not recognized by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, of requiring that every pleading-based motion on 
such a privilege claim be treated as a summary judgment motion and requiring 
that evidentiary material be submitted to support a showing that the privilege 
does not apply. See id. at 1368-69. The Utah courts have never mandated such 
a departure from the requirements for a moving party to prevail under UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 12(c). 
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reversed, in its entirety, and that this case be remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "Tn day "JJa jary 2011. 
/" '"" ""PCTERS I SCOFiELu 
/ A Professional Corporaf'c 
L^A/V 
—David W. Scofield 
Attorneys for Susan I. Moss 
and Jamal S. Yanaki 
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OPINION 
[**899] THORNE, Judge: 
[*P1J Plaintiffs Susan I. Moss and 
Jamal S. Yanaki (collectively, Plaintiffs) 
appeal the district court's ruling granting 
Defendants Parr Waddoups Brown Gee 
& Loveless (Parr); Clark Waddoups; 
Jonathan 0. Hafen; [**900] and Justin 
P. Matkin's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings as to counts two through seven 
of the first amended complaint and 
judgment. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] On April 9, 2002, lomed, Inc. 
filed a complaint against its former 
employee, Yanaki, alleging that Yanaki 
had misappropriated proprietary 
information (lomed case). Iomed was 
represented by Parr, which obtained two 
ex parte discovery orders that directed 
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, 
with the assistance of Iomed, to take 
custody of certain electronically stored 
data and other records maintained at 
Plaintiffs' home office. The discovery 
orders authorized [***2] Iomed to copy 
the files and return the copies to Yanaki 
and to file the originals with the district 
court under seal. The discovery orders 
also allowed Yanaki1 s counsel to review 
the electronic files and make objections 
before they would be made available to 
Iomed's counsel. 
[*P3] On April 15, 2002, Matkin, 
an attorney with Parr, and a Salt Lake 
County deputy sheriff went to Plaintiffs' 
home. Moss answered the door. The 
deputy handed Moss a summons, a 
complaint, and a copy of the discovery 
order authorizing the seizure of 
documents relating to Iomed's claim of 
misappropriation against Yanaki. Yanaki 
was out of town at the time, and Moss 
declined to allow Matkin and the deputy 
into the home. Matkin told Moss he 
intended to obtain a further court order 
and left. The deputy remained at 
Plaintiffs' home while Matkin obtained a 
second order which authorized use of 
reasonable force to enter the house and 
seize the relevant records. Matkin then 
returned with a supplemental order and 
Moss allowed Matkin, the deputy, and 
others into the home to execute the 
discovery order. Subsequently, Yanald's 
computer hard drive and additional 
documents were deposited with the 
district court. • 
1 The parties settled [***3] the 
Iomed case in 2005. 
[*P4] In 2003, while the Iomed case 
was pending, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit 
against Parr and others in the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Utah alleging civil rights violations 
arising from the seizure of evidence 
pursuant to the district court's discovery 
2010 UT App 170, *; 237 P.3d 899, **; 
659 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 2010 Utah App. LEXIS 170, *** 
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orders. In 2004, the federal court 
dismissed the case ruling that it did not 
find a section 1983 violation, see 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), because the 
actions of the private defendants did not 
amount to state action as is required to 
sustain a federal civil rights claim. 
[*P5] In December 2005, Plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint in the 
present suit against Defendants, alleging 
claims for (1) breach of settlement 
agreement, (2) abuse of process, (3) 
invasion of privacy, (4) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, (5) 
trespass to land and chattels, (6) 
conversion, and (7) civil conspiracy. 
After filing an answer, Defendants filed 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
as to counts two through seven pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c). 
The district court heard argument on 
Defendants' motion. The district court 
granted Defendants1 motion to dismiss 
counts two through seven of the 
amended [***4] complaint ruling that 
Defendants were operating within the 
framework of the doctrine of judicial 
privilege and that Plaintiffs were 
collaterally estopped from pursuing their 
claims. Defendants then filed a motion 
for summary judgment as to count one, 
which the district court denied. 
Following an interlocutory appeal, this 
court reversed the denial of that partial 
summary judgment and remanded the 
case for entry of partial summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants, see 
Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless, 2008 UT App 405, P 1, 197 
P. 3d 659. On remand, the district court 
entered partial summary judgment on 
count one of the amended complaint. 
Plaintiffs now appeal from the district 
court's ruling dismissing counts two 
through seven of the amended 
complaint. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
[*P6] Plaintiffs argue that the 
district court erred by granting 
Defendants' motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. "When reviewing a grant of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
this court accepts the factual [**901] 
allegations in the complaint as true; we 
then consider such allegations and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." 
Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. 
Department of Transp., 2004 UT App 
405, P 7, 103 P,3d 716 [***5] (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P7] Plaintiffs argue that the 
district court's judicial privilege rulings, 
and other merit-based rulings, used to 
dismiss the tort claims raised in the 
amended complaint were improper in the 
face of Plaintiffs' allegations of 
2010 UT App 170, 
659 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 201 
Defendants' improper motive in 
obtaining the two discovery orders and 
then illegally searching Plaintiffs' home 
and removing Plaintiffs' property. 
Plaintiffs asserted in their amended 
complaint that Defendants' search of the 
home and seizure of property were 
illegal acts performed in the course of 
litigation in the prior Iomed case against 
Yanaki, constituting actionable tort 
claims for abuse of process, invasion of 
privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, trespass to land and 
chattels, conversion, and civil 
conspiracy. 
[*P8] Plaintiffs' tort claims are each 
based on the assertion that Defendants' 
search of the home was illegal. The 
search was conducted pursuant to two 
presumably valid, court-issued discovery 
orders entered in the Iomed case. See 
generally 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, 
and Orders § 59 (2000) ("All court 
orders are presumed valid and will stand 
until corrected on review or set aside."). 
As such, 1***6] Plaintiffs cannot fault 
Defendants for acting in compliance 
with the court orders. See generally In re 
J.K, 960 P.2d 403, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (holding that the juvenile court 
erred as a matter of law when it faulted 
the state for terminating reunification 
services after the court had specifically 
ordered that those services be 
terminated); cf Carter v. Mitchell, 225 
Page 4 
*; 237 P.3d 899, **; 
0 Utah App, LEXIS 170, *** 
Ala. 287, 142 So. 514, 517 (Ala. 1932) 
(finding that a receiver, acting as a 
representative of the court, is protected 
in carrying out instructions by virtue of a 
valid, though erroneous, order, and that 
the court order under which the receiver 
acts is a complete defense to personal 
liability in any action or proceeding); 
White v. Camden County Sheriffs Dep% 
106 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2003) (stating that l?[c]onduct which is 
intimately associated with the judicial 
phase of the judicial process is protected 
by absolute judicial immunity" and 
finding that an officer is entitled to 
official judicial immunity for actions 
pursuant to a facially valid court order 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Indeed, "disobedience of any lawful 
judgment, order or process of the court" 
constitutes contempt. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-6-301(5) [***7] (2008). 
[*P9] Because each of Plaintiffs' 
tor t claims depends upon a 
determination that the discovery orders 
were illegal, Plaintiffs' claims cannot 
survive without a determination that the 
discovery orders were illegal. Plaintiffs 
did not, however, challenge the 
discovery orders in the proceeding in 
which the orders were issued. "With rare 
exception, when a court with proper 
jurisdiction enters a final judgment, . . . 
that judgment can only be attacked on 
direct appeal." State v. Hamilton, 2003 
2010 UTApp 170,* 
659 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 2010 
UT 22, P 25, 70 P.3d 111. "The general 
rule of law is that a judgment may not be 
drawn in question in a collateral 
proceeding and an attack upon a 
judgment is regarded as collateral if 
made when the judgment is offered as 
the basis of a claim in a subsequent 
proceeding.'" Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT 
App 78, P 15, 132 P. 3d 63 (quoting 
Olsen v. Board o/Educ, 571 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1977)); see also Olsen, 571 
P. 2d at 1338 (noting that a collateral 
attack has been defined as follows: 
"'Where a judgment is attacked in other 
ways than by proceedings in the original 
action to have it vacated or revised or 
modified or by a proceeding in equity to 
prevent its enforcement, the attack is a 
"Collateral Attack.""' [***8] (quoting 
Restatement of Judgments § 11 cmt. a 
(1942))). 
[*P10] Any claimed error regarding 
the discovery orders at issue in this case 
could have been challenged or dealt with 
in the proceeding in which they were 
sought and obtained. Yanaki did not 
challenge or object to the illegality of 
the discovery orders in the Iomed case. 
Plaintiffs' tort claims in the instant case 
are all based on the invalidity of the two 
discovery orders issued in that case. As 
such, each claim represents a collateral 
challenge to the discovery orders. Under 
[**902] the circumstances, Yanaki 
cannot now collaterally attack the 
Page 5 
; 237 P.3d 899, **; 
Utah App, LEXIS 170,*** 
legality of the discovery orders because 
he failed to use any of the available legal 
avenues for challenging the orders at the 
time they were issued or executed in the 
Iomed case. See generally Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22, PP 25, 31, 70 P.3d 111 
(applying the rationale disfavoring 
collateral attacks to preclude a defendant 
from collaterally attacking the validity 
of a tax deed); Collins v. Sandy City Bd. 
of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P 19, 52 
P. 3d 1267 (holding that the plaintiffs 
forfeited their right to attack a decision 
on direct appeal because they could 
have, but elected not to, challenge the 
decision rendered in the [***9] previous 
case); Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah 
Dep't ofCorr., 942 P.2d 933, '946 (Utah 
1997) (declining to consider a collateral 
attack of the justice or equity of orders 
for which no review was sought by the 
defendants). 
[*P11] Although Moss was not a 
party to the Iomed case, she is similarly 
precluded from collaterally attacking the 
validity of the discovery orders. We 
recognize that Moss, as a nonparty to the 
Iomed case, would have had difficulty 
challenging the discovery orders in the 
previous case. See Brigham Young Univ. 
v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 
17, PP 27-47, 156 P.3d 782; see also 
Ashton v. Learnframe, Inc., 2008 UT 
App 172, PP 9-10, 185 P.3d 1135 
(noting and agreeing with the trial court 
2010 UTApp 170,*; 237 
659 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 2010 Utah 
that "nonparties . . . cannot appeal the 
supplemental order"). Nonetheless, 
Moss, who claims to have been affected 
by the search pursuant to the allegedly 
illegal discovery orders, could have 
attacked the validity of the orders by 
filing a motion to intervene or a petition 
for an extraordinary writ. See Ashton, 
185 P. 3d 1135, 2008 UTApp 172, P 12 
(determining that nonparties have two 
options: (1) file a motion to intervene or 
(2) file an extraordinary writ); Trernco, 
2007 UT 17, P 46 n.7, 156 P3d 782 
(same). Moss, [***10] like Yanaki, 
failed tQ use any of the available legal 
avenues for challenging the orders in the 
Iomed case, and as such she cannot now 
collaterally attack the legality of the 
discovery orders, 
[*P12] Because we determine that 
Plaintiffs cannot now collaterally attack 
the legality of the discovery orders, we 
affirm the district court's ruling 
dismissing Plaintiffs' tort claims. 2 Our 
holding is dispositive of this appeal; 
therefore, we do not reach any of 
Plaintiffs' other issues. 
2 The district court applied the res 
judicata principal of collateral 
estoppel and similarly determined 
that Yanaki and Moss were 
precluded from challenging the 
discovery orders. The district court 
ruled, 
P.3d 899, **; 
App. LEXIS 170,*** 
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Plaintiff, Yanaki, 
should have objected to 
the supposed illegality 
of the discovery order in 
the initial Iomed case 
wherein he was sued. He 
never pressed an 
objection to that order. 
He settled the case so 
there was no appeal. It 
is, therefore, presumed 
that the discovery order 
was valid. Yanaki took 
an active part in that 
case. He raised thirty-
one defenses and 
included three counts in 
his counterclaim none of 
which dealt with the 
discovery order. He had 
an ob l iga t ion to 
challenge the order if he 
felt it was illegal 
[***11] or even 
improperly issued, 
especially since Iomed's 
case depended upon it. 
The Plaintiffs are 
collaterally estopped 
from pursuing this 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
2010 UTApp 170, 
659 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 201 
[*P13] Plaintiffs in the instant case 
assert that Defendants' search of their 
home and seizure of property were 
illegal acts, which constitute the 
actionable tort claims raised in their 
amended complaint. Defendants1 actions 
were taken in compliance with two 
discovery orders obtained in the Iomed 
case. Each of Plaintiffs1 causes of action 
depends upon a determination that the 
discovery orders were illegal. Plaintiffs 
did not challenge or object to the 
illegality of the discovery orders in the 
Iomed case. 
[*P14] "The general rule of law is 
that a judgment may not be drawn in 
question in a collateral proceeding and 
an attack upon a judgment is regarded as 
collateral if made when the judgment is 
offered as the basis of a claim in a 
subsequent proceeding." Olsen v. Board 
of Educ, 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1977). Plaintiffs' attack on the discovery 
Page 7 
*;237P.3d899,**; 
0 Utah App. LEXIS 170/** 
orders issued in the Iomed case are being 
used as the basis of their tort claims in 
this case. As such, Plaintiffs' challenge 
to the discovery orders is regarded as a 
collateral attack. Because Plaintiffs 
[***12] failed to use any of the available 
legal avenues for properly challenging 
the discovery orders in the Iomed case, 
they are precluded from collaterally 
attacking [**903] the validity of those 
orders. As a result, the discovery orders 
are presumed valid and we affirm the 
district court's ruling dismissing 
Plaintiffs' tort claims. 
[*P15] Affirmed. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
[*P16] WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTA^^LAKE|OUI^TY 
MAR 2 8 2007 
SAL' 
Deputy Cierfc 
SUSAN I. MOSS and JAMAL S. 
YANAKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE 
& LOVELESS, a Utah professional 
Corporation; et aL, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
Civil No. 050913371 
The Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings as to counts 2 through 7 of the first 
amended complaint. The Court heard the motions on February 15,2007, with Alan L. Sullivan 
appearing for the Defendants and David W. Scofield appearing for the Plaintiffs. After hearing 
oral arguments the Court took the motion under advisement. The Court having reviewed the 
material provided now rules on the motion. 
This is the third time some of these parties and some of these issues have been before the 
courts. First, lomed, Inc. (" lomed") sued Jamal Yanaki ("Yanaki") and others on or about Apri] 
12,2002. The parties settled that case without trial. Later, Yanaki sued lomed and others in the 
federal disrict court alleging a Section 1983 civil rights violation. That case was dismissed. The 
federal court did not find a Section 1983 violation and declined to hear the state law claims. The 
third court action is Susan I. Moss ("Moss") and Yanaki suing Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
APPENDIX 2 UU6 
Loveless, a Utah professional corporation ("Pair Waddoups") and others. Parr Waddoups is the 
law firm that represented lomed in the first action. 
This case centers around a discovery order issued by the court in the first action. Parr 
Waddoups received a discovery order allowing them to go into Yanaki's home and take 
information from his computer. The order was issued by a district court judge. The Petitioners 
claim this was a search and seizure under the criminal law and not a valid discovery order under 
the civil law. 
If Plaintiffs' position is accepted, then there could be no real discovery in a civil action of 
this nature. lomed would have to give advance notice of the material to be discovered. If Yanaki 
had indeed stolen trade secrets and they were on his computer, he would have ample opportunity 
to hide the material or destroy it There is little reason to suppose that a person who would steal 
such things would not hide or destroy them to avoid being found out. 
In this case the Defendants did everything that they could reasonably have been expected 
to do. They filed a lawsuit, moved for an order to conduct immediate discovery, supported the 
motion by affidavits, received an order allowing immediate discovery issued by a district judge, 
and, when a problem arose during the attemped search, even obtained a supplemental order in aid 
of enforcement The discovery order and the execution of it were carefully limited. Those 
executing the discovery order were escorted directly to the computer. Nothing else in the house 
was searched. Only the computer information was taken. Copies were left for Yanaki. The 
original was not given to lomed but to the court. It was to be used only as authorized by the 
court. A law enforcement officer, assisted by others, executed the discovery order. The one 
offensive aspect of the execution of the discovery order was the presence of a lawyer from Parr 
Waddoups. This seems less offensive, however, when it is remembered that counsel is normally 
present during discovery. The Parr Waddoups lawyer only did what the order authorized him to 
do. The discovery order was reasonable and necessary to preserve evidence. There are very few 
instances when this kind of discovery would be justified and this one of them. It does not offend 
the Court's sense of justice to see it used in a case such as this. 
The discovery order also affected Moss. She lived with Yanaki and was his fiancee. She -
was the person at home when the discovery order was executed. In the current action her counsel 
refers to Moss and Yanaki as a married couple. Since the computer was in their home she. 
became subject to the discovery order and is bound by the outcome of the lomed action. She was 
not a party in the lomed case but she could have intervened in it. The discovery order was 
intended to affect Moss minimally. It was directed to the contents of the computer which could 
not be reached without entering their home. 
The Plaintiff, YanaM, should have objected to the supposed illegality of the discovery 
order in the initial lomed case wherein he was sued. He never pressed an objection to that order. 
He settled the case so there was no appeal. It is, therefore, presumed that the discovery order Was 
valid. Yanaki took an active part in that case. He raised thirty-one defenses and included three 
counts in his counterclaim none of which dealt with the discovery order. He had an obligation to 
challenge the order if he felt it was illegal or even improperly issued, especially since lomed's 
case depended upon it. The Plaintiffs are collaterlly estopped from pursuing this claim. 
Counts two through seven of the amended complaint are all interconnected. None can 
stand independent of the discovery order. All are based on it. 
This Court must also recognize the Defendants' right to petition government. The parties 
to a lawsuit are subject to the doctrine of judicial privilege. The judicial proceedings privilege 
"is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom 
in their efiforts to secure justice for their clients." Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64,286 P.2d 
1057 (1955). The Defendants were operating within the framework of this privilege. 
The Defendants' motion to dismiss counts two through seven of the amended complaint 
is granted. Counsel for the Defendants is directed to draw the formal order. 
Dated this 20fh day of March, 2007. 
•i^yfc*-*.-
Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN I. MOSS and JAMAL S. YANAKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & 
LOVELESS, a Utah professional 
corporation; CLARK WADDOUPS; 
JONATHAN O. HAFEN; JUSTIN P, 
MATKTN; and JOHN DOES I through XX, 
Defendants. i 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS 
TO COUNTS H THROUGH VH OF THE 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 050913371 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
On February 15,2007, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts II 
through y n of the First Amended Complaint came for hearing before the Court, with the 
Honorable Douglas L. Comaby, Senior Judge, presiding. David W. Scofield appeared on behalf 
of plaintiffs, and Alan L. Sullivan appeared on behalf of defendants. At the close of oral 
argument, the Court took the motion under advisement. On March 20, 2007, the Court issued its 
Ruling on Motion, which granted the motion. 
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Based upon the Court's previous Ruling on Motion, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby granted, and Counts II through VIT of the First Amended 
Complaint, are hereby dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling on 
Motion. 
DATED this Jj_ day of April, 2007. 
Approved as to foim: 
• SCHOHELD PRICE 
Scofieldt 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTMCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7 day of -kp£, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by first class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
David W. Scofield 
Ronald F. Price 
PETERS SCHOFIELD PRICE 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
340 Broadway Gentre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: {801)322-2002 
Facsimile: (801)322-2003 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN I. Moss and JAMAL S, YANAKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs- i 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & 
LOVELESS, a Utah professional 
corporation; CLARK WADDOUPS; 
JONATHAN O. HAFEN; JUSTIN P. MATKIN; 
and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH XX, 
Defendants. j 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 050913371 
Honorable Leslie A Lewis 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Plaintiffs, for their claims against defendants, allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Susan I, Moss ("Moss") is an individual residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, whose home is at 385 North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Home"). 
2, Plaintiff Jamal S. Yanaki ("Yanaki"), who resides at the Home, is a former 
employee of lomedt Inc. flomed"), at which his last day of employment was January 
17, 2002. 
APPENDIX 4 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
3. This case arises out of a successful conspiracy to misuse a legal process 
and to cause an illegal search of the Home and seizure of property therein by the Salt 
Lake County Sheriffs Office (the "Police"), named defendant Justin P. Matkin ("Matkin") 
and certain unnamed co-conspirators. The Police, together with Matkin, illegally 
entered the Home and illegally conducted a search of the Home and seizure of property 
without a valid search warrant, with no exception to the requirement of a valid search 
warrant and in violation of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States 
of America (the "Illegal Search and Seizure"). The Illegal Search and Seizure, being 
illegal, constituted an actionable invasion of privacy, conversion, trespass to land and 
chattels and extreme and outrageous conduct, 
4. lomed conspired with the named defendants to cause the misuse of a 
legal process and the Illegal Search and Seizure by the Police, pursuant to which the 
Police and the co-conspirators, some of whom are the named defendants herein, 
committed the torts alleged herein. The details are set forth below. 
5. On April 9, 2002, a complaint was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah in a case captioned lomed, inc. v. Jamal Yanaki, Activatek, L.L.C., 
Ceramatec, Inc., Ashok Joshi and John Does l-X. The complaint was assigned case 
number 020903031 and was assigned to the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Third District 
Court Judge. Co-conspirator Robert L. Lollini, who was then the Chief Operating Officer 
of lomed, gave the instructions to defendants to cause the complaint to be filed. 
6. The following day, on April 10, 2002, lomed and its lawyers, defendants 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, P.C. ("Law Firm"), Clark Waddoups 
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("Waddoups"), Jonathan 0, Hafen ("Hafen") and Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
caused to be filed an Ex Parte Motion for Order to Conduct Immediate Discovery to 
Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence (the "Search Motion"), At the time they 
caused such Search Motion to be filed, defendants knew that the relief they sought was 
illegal under both the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States of 
America. 
7. Although the co-conspirators purported by the Search Motion to seek a 
legal process for ostensibly lawful purposes, i.e., to protect trade secrets and conduct 
discovery, they in fact sought a legal process for illegal purposes and with ulterior 
motivations. 
8. Yanaki had left lomed's employment approximately three months before the 
Search Motion was filed. Co-conspirator Iomed was, during the material time period 
surrounding the filing of the Search Motion, seeking to get its employees to sign new 
forms of non-compete agreements. Iomed desired to misuse a legal process to cause an 
illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its employees that they would be better 
off signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided. The 
ulterior motive of misusing the legal process to conduct the Illegal Search and Seizure of 
the Home was thus designed to put an exclamation point on the dangers to Iomed 
employees of leaving Iomed rather than signing the new form of agreements. 
9. Defendants agreed to help their client, iomed, place such exclamation point 
by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and seizure by the police, and 
by using the diversionary approach to the state judge of ostensibly protecting trade 
secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, rather than what they were realty 
doing, namely, seeking to have the Police conduct an illegal raid. 
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10. However, as defendants knew, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23~204(2)(a) 
expressly limits the class of applicants for a search warrant to a "peace officer o r . . . 
prosecuting attorney," The defendants knew they did not fit into either such class. 
11. In addition, defendants knew that private search warrants have long been 
outlawed by the states. See, e g„ Womack v. State, 281 Ala. 499, 503, 205 So.2d 579, 
582 (1967) ("Search warrants are criminal processes, issued under the police power of 
the state, to aid in the detection or suppression of crime, and have no relation to civil 
process ortriais.");L/pp/nan v. People, 175 III. 101, 111, 51 N.E. 872, 874-75 (1898) (The 
premises of a citizen cannot be intruded upon under a search warrant, for any such 
private purpose."); State v. Derry, 171 Ind. 18, 24, 85 N.E. 765, 768 (1908) ("Neither at 
common law, nor under the statute, is such process [search warrants] available to 
individuals in the course of civil proceedings, nor for the maintenance of any mere private 
right. It may only be invoked in the furtherance of public prosecutions."); Robinson v. 
Richardson, 79 Mass. 454, 456 (1859) ("Search warrants were never recognized by the 
common law as processes which might be availed of by individuals in the course of civil 
proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but their use was confined 
to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the 
detection and punishment of criminals."); State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 
191,197, 224 P. 862, 864 (1924) ("The power to make searches and seizures is 
absolutely necessary to the public welfare. But the process may be invoked only in 
furtherance of public prosecutions,"); Luciano v. Marshall, 95 Nev. 276, 278, 593 P.2d 
751,752 (1979) ("[T]he legitimate use of the search warrant is restricted to public 
prosecutions, and . . . in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of 
any mere private right."); Alien v. Trueman} 100 Utah 36, 49,110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941) 
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("Search warrants were never recognized by the common law as processes wnicn mignt 
be availed of by individuals in the course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance of 
any mere private right; but their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions, 
instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of 
criminals." quoting People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 797 (1913)). 
12. Defendants knew at the time they agreed to seek such legal process that it 
would constitute a violation of, at the least, UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 14,23-24, ART. VI, § 
26, according to the holding of Men v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49,110 P.2d 355, 361 
(1941), as well as U.S. CONST, AMEND. IV, V, XIV, to use such legal process to conduct a 
search and seizure at a private home. 
13. The legal process obtained, the Search Order, was unlawful for any such 
purpose. 
14. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, April 15, 2002, Matkin 
and Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Heinz Kopp ("Kopp"), rang the doorbell of the 
Home three separate times, awakening Moss. Kopp and the Police agreed to join the 
conspiracy, by misusing the legal process to commit the Illegal Search and Seizure, 
and to be paid by the conspirators for doing so, no later than this time. 
15. Yanaki was then in the state of Colorado. 
16. Moss, still in her pajamas, looked through the small window in the front 
door and saw a police officer, whom she did not then know was Kopp, with another 
man, whom she did not then know was Matkin. Only because of the Police presence, 
Moss answered the door to her Home. Kopp handed Moss a summons, complaint and 
copy of the legal process in the form of the Search Order, 
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17. After reading portions of the Search Order and seeing that is was directed 
to Yanaki, Moss advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki was not Home and she would 
not allow them in her Home without Yanaki being present. 
18. Matkin then said "We can come in now, or we can come in later." Kopp, 
to support Matkin's statement and to intimidate Moss, said: "We can kick in this door," 
and Matkin advised Moss that he was going to get a further legal process, impliedly 
allowing them to do so, 
19. Matkin then left while Kopp remained, surveying the Home and thereby 
intimidating Moss. 
20. On information and belief, Matkin then, in furtherance of Kopp's threat to 
kick down the door to gain entrance to Moss and Yanaki's Home, made a second, ex 
parte, approach to Judge Medley the morning of April 15, 2002, requesting a further 
legal process in the form of a writ of assistance for the Search Order. Neither the state 
court docket nor state court file reflect what Judge Medley was told by Matkin when he 
sought that writ. 
21. Nevertheless, Matkin obtained the second legal process he sought on 
lomed's behalf, and procured Judge Medley's signature on a writ of assistance, 
captioned: "Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement" (hereinafter "Writ of 
Assistance") and dated and entered by the Court on April 15, 2002. The Writ of 
Assistance, no different than the Search Order, constituted a legal process that, under 
both the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States of America, could not 
be lawfully used to conduct a search and seizure. 
22. The Writ of Assistance expressly directed the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
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Office first, "to enter the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385 
North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103" and, then, "use reasonable force, if 
necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute the Order [Allowing 
immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence], including 
entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining 
any person who resists enforcement of the Order." 
23. As was the case with the Search Order, the Writ of Assistance was 
obtained not at the request of any law enforcement agency or other governmental 
agency, but instead solely at the request of a private party in civil litigation. 
24. The Writ of Assistance was not obtained for the benefit or in furtherance 
of the desires of law enforcement pertaining to any criminal action or investigation or of 
any governmental agency to investigate civil violations of any governmental regulatory 
scheme or to pursue any civil forfeiture action of any governmental agency or otherwise 
to further any interest of any governmental agency of any kind or nature, but solely and 
strictly for the benefit of an individual citizen. 
25. Because there is no record currently available to plaintiff showing the 
grounds presented to Judge Medley to obtain the Writ of Assistance, plaintiff infers the 
same bases were proffered as for the Search Order, which do not incorporate any 
prescribed statutory or administrative standards, that, themselves, are reasonable in 
their careful balancing of governmental and private interests before an order may issue 
thereunder authorizing a search of a person's home, by use of force, seizure of their 
property, or arrest of the person of anyone interfering with the foregoing activities. 
26. Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance mandate a 
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right to a prior hearing before any search, contain any standards for determining 
reasonableness or even require, as a prerequisite to the relief sought, that a prior 
request for materials be made and refused, before invading a private citizen's home or 
arresting any citizen. Nor did any proffered legal basis for the Writ of Assistance 
provide any prior opportunity to be heard before a seizure or even any post-seizure right 
to hearing. 
27. Matkin returned to Moss' Home with the Writ of Assistance, and Matkin, 
Kopp and two other co-conspirators, all, in a deliberate show of force, came to the door 
of Moss' Home while the illegal Writ of Assistance was served on Moss. 
28. Moss, under the illegal threat of having the door to her Home kicked in 
and under the illegal threat of being "detained" if she interfered with the illegal search 
and seizure, had no voluntary alternative and stepped aside as Matkin, Kopp and two of 
the other co-conspirators illegally entered her Home and commenced the Illegal Search 
and Seizure. 
29, Shortly thereafter, another Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Sergeant 
Kendra L. Herlin, also arrived to reinforce the illegal threat to "detain" Moss if she 
attempted to stop the Illegal Search and Seizure, 
30, Kopp, Matkin and the two other co-conspirators who illegally entered the 
Home without lawful authority, justification or consent, then illegally searched it and 
illegally seized property belonging to Moss, Yanaki and third parties; all the while, Kopp 
and the defendants knew that the legal process obtained could not be used lawfully to 
threaten to kick in the door to the Home, threaten to "detain" anyone who interfered with 
such illegal act, search the Home or seize property therein. 
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31. The property of Yanaki and Moss was then taken, without the consent of 
either, to, on information and belief, the place of business of one of the co-conspirators. 
32. The object of the conspiracy was to misuse the legal processes obtained so 
as to conduct an illegal search and seizure. That object was successfully carried out on 
April 15, 2002, when the Police, Matkin and other co-conspirators used the legal process 
to illegally entered into the Home, through the illegal threat of force and detention, 
conducted an illegal search and illegally seized property. 
33. Each of the co-conspirators, including without limitation the defendants and 
the police, agreed to commit, and did commit, one or more acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, in order to allow the conspiracy to obtain its object successfully, 
34. On April 14,2003, Moss and Yanaki each filed suit against defendants and 
certain other private co-conspirators in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, seeking relief under the federal civil rights laws and under state law. That action 
was dismissed, as to the federal claims, the district court finding that the actions of the 
private defendants did not amount to "state action" as is required to sustain a federal civil 
rights claim. However, the district judge expressly found, referring in part to the same 
defendants who appear now before this Court: The invasion of Plaintiffs home, 
supported only by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit, 
appears to be precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling that the 
Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent Defendants' protestations to the contrary, an 
ex parte motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is not the equivalent of 
a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an independent law enforcement 
officer. If there was a sufficient basis for finding that Defendants' actions in this case 
were committed under color of state law, this Court would find that Plaintiffs were 
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deprived of a right secured by the 'Constitution and Laws' of the United States." Yanakl 
v, lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261,1264 n.7 (D. Utah 2004). The district court 
suggested the possibility that defendants' conduct may give rise to an abuse of process 
claim: "As noted in footnote seven, above, the behavior of the Defendants may have 
been inadvisable and abusive of Plaintiffs' rights, and may or may not give rise to other 
legal causes of action, such as perhaps abuse of process, but the Defendants' actions 
were undisputedly not initiated by the state, and therefore pursuant to the precedent 
referred to in the body of this opinion may not serve as a basis for a claim under § 1983," 
Id. at 1265 n.8. The dismissal was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, Yanakiv. lomed, lnc.} 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), and that case is 
now before the United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 05-940, on a petition for 
certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's decision. 
35. Plaintiffs had entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants and 
certain of the other co-conspirators on December 12, 2003. 
36. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Jamal S. Yanaki was to be 
paid the settlement sum, in exchange for a full release to the settling co-conspirators by 
Moss and Yanaki. 
37. Defendants breached the settlement agreement by failing to timely pay or 
cause to be paid the settlement sum to Yanaki. 
COUNT I 
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT) 
38. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 37, above, 
39. Defendants have materially breached the settlement agreement. 
40. Such breach has been the cause of damages to Moss and Yanaki, 
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including without limitation the foreseeable, consequential damages of being required to 
incur attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in litigation that was to be resolved by the 
settlement 
41. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages for defendants' breach, 
including consequential and special damages in the form of attorneys' fees, costs and 
expenses, together with interest on all the damages that have accrued, both before and 
after judgment. 
COUNT II 
(ABUSE OF PROCESS) 
42. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 41, above. 
43. Ulterior motives existed that were served by the object of the conspiracy, 
such that the process at issue in this case was sought for the purpose of using it 
improperly to commit illegal acts. 
44. The Illegal Search and Seizure constitute acts, in the use of the legal 
processes obtained, that are not proper in the regular prosecution of civil proceedings 
and the misuse of the processes constitutes an actionable abuse of process. 
45. The abuse of process took place in the respective course and scope of 
employment of Matkin, Waddoups and Hafen with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & 
Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat superior. 
46. The acts of the defendants if furtherance of the conspiracy constitute an 
actionable abuse of process, and such abuse has been the cause-in-fact and legal cause 
of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than 
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has 
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also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries 
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his 
physical injuries. 
47. The abuse of process represents a wilful disregard for the rights of 
plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each 
defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co, v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
COUNT 111 
(INVASION OF PRIVACY) 
48. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 47, above. 
49. The invasion of the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and 
the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as YanakPs 
confidential medical records, constitutes an actionable intrusion upon plaintiffs' seclusion. 
50. The intrusion described would be highly offensive to any reasonable 
person. 
51. The intrusion took place in the respective course and scope of employment 
of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat 
superior. 
52. Further, the intrusion on seclusion was part and parcel of the pleaded 
conspiracy, making all conspirators liable. The intrusion upon plaintiffs' seclusion has 
been the cause-in-fact and legal cause of injury to plaintiffs, Moss has been damaged in 
the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be 
proven at trial. Yanaki has also been damaged in such sum, together with additional 
12 
damages for physical injuries and special damages incurred in the form of health care 
expenses incurred to treat his physical injuries. 
53. The intrusion on seclusion represents a wilful disregard for the rights of 
plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each 
defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co, v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
COUNT IV 
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) 
54. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 53, above. 
55. The invasion the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the 
seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as Yanaki's confidential 
medical records, was outrageous and intolerable in that It offended generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality, including such standards as are expressly 
enumerated in the Constitutions of the state of Utah and the United States of America. 
56. Defendants intended to cause or acted with reckless disregard of the 
likelihood of causing emotional distress to plaintiffs. 
57. The defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct was the cause-in-fact 
and legal cause of plaintiffs' severe emotional distress. 
58. The extreme and outrageous conduct of defendants took place in the 
respective course and scope of employment of Matkin, Waddoups and Hafen with Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable under respondeat superior. 
59. Further, the extreme and outrageous conduct was part and parcel of the 
pleaded conspiracy, making all conspirators liable, 
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60. The extreme and outrageous conduct has been the cause-in-fact and legal 
cause of injury to plaintiffs. Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than 
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has 
also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries 
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his 
physical injuries. 
61. The extreme and outrageous conduct represents a wilful disregard for the 
rights of plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against 
each defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
COUNT V 
(TRESPASS TO LAND AND CHATTELS) 
62. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 61, above. 
63. Plaintiffs were, at all times material hereto, lawfully in possession of the 
Home and its contents, 
64. The invasion of the Home by Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and 
the seizure of plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as Yanaki's 
confidential medical records, was a trespass to land and chattels. 
65. The trespasses took place in the respective course and scope of 
employment of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, and it is liable 
under respondeat superior, 
66. Further, the trespasses were part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy, 
making all conspirators liable. The trespasses have been the cause-in-fact and legal 
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cause of injury to plaintiffs, Moss has been damaged in the sum of not less than 
$15,000,000.00, or such other and greater sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has 
also been damaged in such sum, together with additional damages for physical injuries 
and special damages incurred in the form of health care expenses incurred to treat his 
physical injuries. 
67. The trespasses each represent a wilful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs, 
thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each defendant, for 
each trespass, in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
COUNT VI 
(CONVERSION) 
68. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 67 above. 
69. Plaintiffs, at all times material hereto, were in lawful possession of the 
chattels seized and removed from the Home. 
70. Matkin, in furtherance of the conspiracy, converted plaintiffs' chattels with 
an intent to deprive plaintiffs of their possession or use for a period of time. 
71. The conversions took place in the respective course and scope of 
employment of Matkin with Parr, Waddoups, BrownT Gee & Loveless, and it is liable 
under respondeat superior. 
72. Further, the conversions were part and parcel of the pleaded conspiracy, 
making ail conspirators liable. The conversions have been the cause-in-fact and legal 
cause of injury to plaintiffs, Moss and Yanaki have been damaged in such sums as may 
be proven at trial for the reasonable value of their property, together with all reasonably 
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foreseeable consequential damages, 
73. The conversions each represent a wilful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs, 
thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages award against each defendant, for 
each conversion, in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
COUNT VII 
(CIVIL CONSPIRACY) 
74. Moss incorporates paragraphs 1 through 73, above. 
75. Each of the defendants acted in concert, by way of a combination of two or 
more persons, with the police and other co-conspirators. 
76. The conspiracy had one or more objects, as described above, in % 30, or as 
otherwise may be uncovered in discovery in this action. 
77. There was a meeting of the minds between each combination of two or 
more conspirators as to the object of the conspiracy and/or the courses of action by 
which it would be carried forward. 
78. Each of the conspirators undertook one or more unlawful, overt acts in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
79. The acts of one or more conspirators in furtherance of the object of the 
conspiracy have been the cause-in-fact and legal cause of damages to plaintiffs. Moss 
has been damaged in the sum of not less than $15,000,000.00, or such other and greater 
sum as may be proven at trial. Yanaki has also been damaged in such sum, together 
with additional damages for physical injuries and special damages incurred in the form of 
health care expenses incurred to treat his physical injuries 
80. The conduct of the conspiracy in pursuit of its object represents a wilful 
disregard for the rights of plaintiffs, thereby entitling each of them to a punitive damages 
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award against each defendant in conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Plaintiffs each hereby demand trial by jury of all issues triable by a jury herein. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor, and against defendants, 
jointly and severally, as follows: 
A. For all damages proved to the satisfaction of the court and jury. Such 
damages including without limitation damages for the injury to specific rights invaded, 
damages for the emotional distress caused, damages for the physical injury caused by 
such emotional distress, pain and suffering and special damages in the form of health 
care expenses, attorney fees, costs and expenses and all other reasonable foreseeable 
consequential damages, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest 
B. On Counts ll-VII, for punitive damages against each defendant, awarded in 
conformity with the principles of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
D. For all of plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as 
allowed at law, in equity, by statute, rule, inherent power of the Court or otherwise. 
E. For all such other and further relief of any kind or nature to which plaintiffs 
may show entitlement by proof and as the Court deems just, proper and equitable in the 
premises. 
[THIS SPA CE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY] 
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DATED this T day of February, 2006. 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
'rofessional Corporation 
\ \BA^\D-
_D£VfbW. SCOFIELE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
385 North Wall Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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